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Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
Time: 1:46 am
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Results for financial crime
49 results foundAuthor: Financial Crimes Enforcement Network Title: Mortgage Loan Fraud Connections With Other Financial Crimes: An Evaluation of Suspicious Activity Reports Filed by Money Services Businesses, Securities and Future Firms, Insurance Companies and Casinos. Summary: This study seeks to understand the relationship between mortgage loan fraud and other financial crime and to identify ways in which financial crime extends through multiple financial industries. Previous Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) studies have identified general trends and patterns in Suspicious Activity Reports (SARS) that documented suspected mortgage loan fraud. This study examines the activities of a group of individuals and organizations reported in depository institution SARS (SAR-DIs) for suspected mortgage loan fraud ("MLF subjects") and identifies patterns of activities associated with these MLF subjects evaluating three other types of SARSs: those filed by money services businesses (SAR-MSBs); securities brokers, securities dealers, or insurance companies (SAR-SFs); and casinos or card clubs (SAR-Cs). Details: Vienna, VA: FinCEN, 2009. 24p. Source: Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 113846 Keywords: Financial CrimeFraud |
Author: Kar, Dev Title: Russia: Illicit Financial Flows and the Role of the Underground Economy Summary: This study presents estimates of various types of capital flows to and from post-Soviet Russia. We argue that while netting out is a valid concept related to licit flows, illicit flows in both directions should be added in order to assess their adverse impact on the economy. Simultaneous equation modeling shows that total illicit flows both drive and are driven by underground economic activities. The latter is used as a proxy for the state of overall governance in Russia, which continues to be a serious issue. We suggest a range of domestic and international policy measures to curtail the cross-border transmission of illicit financial flows to and from Russia. Details: Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2013. 84p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 15, 2013 at: http://russia.gfintegrity.org/Russia_Illicit_Financial_Flows_and_the_Role_of_the_Underground_Economy-HighRes.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Russia URL: http://russia.gfintegrity.org/Russia_Illicit_Financial_Flows_and_the_Role_of_the_Underground_Economy-HighRes.pdf Shelf Number: 127632 Keywords: CorruptionFinancial CrimeMoney Laundering (Russia)Underground Economy |
Author: Schneider, Friedrich Title: The Shadow Economy Summary: Summary: • Measurement of the shadow economy is notoriously difficult as it requires estimation of economic activity that is deliberately hidden from official transactions. Surveys typically understate the size of the shadow economy but econometric techniques can now be used to obtain a much better understanding of its size. • The shadow economy constitutes approximately 10 per cent of GDP in the UK; about 14 per cent in Nordic countries and about 20–30 per cent in many southern European countries. • The main drivers of the shadow economy are (in order): tax and social security burdens, tax morale, the quality of state institutions and labour market regulation. A reduction in the tax burden is therefore likely to lead to a reduction in the size of the shadow economy. Indeed, a virtuous circle can 
be created of lower tax rates, less shadow work, higher tax morale, a higher tax take and the opportunity for lower rates. Of course, a vicious circle in the other direction can also be created. • Given this relationship, the high level of non-wage costs (averaging 39 per cent of total labour costs) and the penalty on individuals who move from earning one third to two thirds of the median wage (averaging 58 per cent of the increase in earnings for a one-earner couple) in the European Union should be a matter of real concern. The latter figure
is 79 per cent in the UK and thus low-paid UK workers have a huge incentive to supplement their incomes in the shadow economy. • The number of participants in the shadow economy is very large. Although up-to-date figures are not available, at the end of the twentieth century up to 30 million people performed shadow work in the EU and up to 48 million in the OECD. Reliable detailed studies are not available for many countries. In Denmark, however, the latest studies suggest that about half the population purchases shadow work. In some
sectors – such as construction – about half the workforce
is working in the shadow economy, often in addition to formal employment. Only a very small proportion of shadow economy workers can be accounted for by illegal immigrants in most countries. • In western Europe, shadow work is relatively prevalent among the unemployed and the formally employed. Other non-employed (for example, the retired, homemakers
and students) do relatively less shadow work. This has implications for policy in terms of the importance of social security systems that reduce the opportunities for shadow work among the unemployed and the importance of tax systems that do not discourage the declaring of extra income. • Policies focused on deterrence are not likely to be especially successful when tackling the shadow economy. The shadow economy is pervasive and made up of a huge number of small and highly dispersed transactions. We should also be wary about trying to stamp out the shadow economy as we may stamp out the entrepreneurship and business formation that goes with it. • There are, however, huge potential benefits from allowing 
the self-employed and small businesses to formalise their arrangements. Businesses cannot flourish if they remain in the shadow economy. They might be reluctant to formalise, however, if it involves admitting to past indiscretions. Worthwhile policies include: reducing business compliance regulation; amnesties; providing limited tax shelters 
for small-scale informal activity such as the provision of interest-bearing loans to relatives and friends; and allowing businesses to formalise using simple ‘off the shelf’ models. Such policies have been successful in other countries – and to a limited extent in the UK – with high benefit-to-cost ratios. • Given that the shadow economy constitutes a high proportion of national income, and varies between less than 8 per cent of national income and over 30 per cent of national income in OECD countries, official national income statistics can often be misleading. Comparisons are made even more difficult because some countries adjust figures for the shadow economy (for example, Italy) and others do not. • In less developed countries, the informal sector constitutes typically between 25 and 40 per cent of national income and represents up to 70 per cent of non-agricultural employment. In such countries, informal activity often arises because of the inadequacies of legal systems when it comes to formalising business registration. Details: London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 2013. 184p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 5, 2013 at: http://www.iea.org.uk/publications/research/the-shadow-economy Year: 2013 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.iea.org.uk/publications/research/the-shadow-economy Shelf Number: 128963 Keywords: Commercial CrimesEconomic CrimesFinancial CrimeShadow Economy (U.K.)Tax EvasionUnderground Economy |
Author: Simpson, Sally S. Title: Corporate Crime Deterrence: A Systematic Review Summary: BACKGROUND Corporate crime is a poorly understood problem with little known about effective strategies to prevent and control it. Competing definitions of corporate crime affect how the phenomenon is studied and implications for reducing it. Therefore, in this review, we use John Braithwaite's definition (1984: 6) which specifies that corporate crime is "the conduct of a corporation, or of employees acting on behalf of a corporation, which is proscribed and punishable by law." Consistent with this approach, this review focuses on various legal strategies aimed at companies and their officials/managers to curtail corporate crime. Interventions may be punitive or cooperative, but the goal is to prevent offending and increase levels of corporate compliance. OBJECTIVES Our overall objective is to identify and synthesize published and unpublished studies on formal legal and administrative prevention and control strategies—i.e., the actions and programs of government law enforcement agencies, legislative bodies, and regulatory agencies on corporate crime. We then assess the impact of these strategies on individual and company offending. Included are legal and administrative interventions such as new laws or changes in laws, inspections by regulatory agencies, punitive sanctions and non-punitive interventions aimed at deterring or controlling illegal behaviors. CRITERIA FOR INCLUSION OF STUDIES We were highly inclusive in our selection criteria, including studies that encompass a wide variety of methodologies: experimental (e.g., lab studies or vignette surveys), quasi-experimental (e.g., pre/post-tests), and non-experimental (e.g., correlational statistics using secondary data). The studies included also contained a wide variety of data (e.g., data from official agencies, corporate reports, individuals' survey responses, etc.). Our search included published and unpublished articles, reports, documents, and other readily available sources. The outcome of interest, corporate offending, could reflect actual behavior or behavioral intentions as reported by respondents. Out of the 40 possible treatment categories, we were able to calculate a mean effect size for 19. Although most showed a positive albeit non-significant treatment effect, some (including a significant effect) were iatrogenic. Looking at the specific mechanisms, the impact of law on corporate crime showed a modest deterrent effect at the firm and geographical level of analysis (there was not enough data to calculate effect sizes for individuals). However, this finding is limited to cross-sectional studies. For punitive sanctions, where there was substantially more data from which to calculate effect sizes, we observe a similar pattern: A tendency toward deterrence across units of analysis, with relatively few significant effects regardless of whether data are cross-sectional or longitudinal. The one area where there appears to be a consistent treatment effect is in the area of regulatory policy, but only at the individual level. Effects for other levels are contradictory (with some positive and others iatrogenic) and none are statistically significant. Regarding moderator effects, the least methodologically rigorous designs— those that were not experimental versus experimental designs and those without statistical control variables versus controls were associated with a treatment effect. We also found that older studies were associated with stronger deterrent effects—perhaps because the older studies are less methodologically rigorous that those that are newer. Other moderator results were less clear (publication bias, country bias, disciplinary bias; offense type), but given how few of the analyses revealed strong treatment effects overall we think it is premature to draw any conclusions from these findings and call instead for more methodologically rigorous and focused studies particularly in the punitive sanction and regulatory policy areas. Details: Oslo: Campbell Collaboration, 2014. 106p. Source: Internet Resource: Campbell Systematic Review 2014:4: Accessed May 5, 2014 at: http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/lib/project/199/ Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/lib/project/199/ Shelf Number: 132243 Keywords: Corporate CrimeCrime PreventionDeterrenceFinancial CrimeFraudWhite-Collar Crime |
Author: Samani, Raj Title: Digital Laundry: An analysis of online currencies, and their use in cybercrime Summary: The European Central Bank (ECB) points out notable differences between virtual currency and electronic money schemes. Electronic money uses a traditional unit of currency and is regulated; virtual currencies are unregulated and use an invented currency. Virtual currencies offer a number of benefits to customers: They are reliable, relatively instant, and anonymous. Even when privacy issues have been raised with particular currencies (notably Bitcoin), the market has responded with extensions to provide greater anonymity. Market response is an important point because regardless of law enforcement actions against Liberty Reserve and e-gold, criminals quickly identify new platforms to launder their funds. As a platform grows in popularity, so too will attacks and subsequent law enforcement actions. We saw this recently with Liberty Reserve and e-gold, and the recent cyberattacks against Bitcoin. Increasing popularity also raises the attention of law enforcement officials. Despite such platforms establishing their operations in countries considered as "tax havens," its operators are still subject to investigation, and possibly arrest. This concern recently led to the Russian Foreign Ministry warning its citizens who suspect they may be arrested to avoid countries with extradition treaties with the United States. The warning cited the arrest of Liberty Reserve's founder as an example. Although money laundering and cyberattacks are the focus of this paper, electronic currencies also act as the main method of payment for illicit products such as drugs, as well as for other products and services that enable cybercrime. We discussed products and services in Cybercrime Exposed: Cybercrime-as-a-Service; we'll look at drugs in this paper when we discuss the Silk Road market. The Silk Road is the best known online drug market but it is only the tip of the iceberg, as there are numerous such marketplaces. Regardless of the level of scrutiny by regulators and law enforcement, criminals will continue to migrate activities to alternate platforms. They have done this with Liberty Reserve and e-gold, to name two examples; simply shutting down the leading platform will not solve the problem. Details: Santa Clara, CA: McAfee, 2013. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 10, 2014 at: http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-digital-laundry.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 132315 Keywords: CybercrimeDigital CrimeFinancial CrimeMoney LaunderingOnline Crime |
Author: Dugato, Marco Title: The Crime against Businesses in Europe: A Pilot Survey Summary: The project "EU Survey to assess the level and impact of crimes against business - Stage 2: Piloting the survey module" aims at carrying out a pilot survey on the victimisation of businesses across twenty selected European countries. The main objectives of this project are: - Implementing a business victimisation pilot survey in unexplored countries of the EU - Developing a common methodology - Collecting comparable data - Analysing data in order to produce comparable results - Reporting the results in order to produce policy implications The pilot survey method implements a phased multi-mode approach, first of all by conducting a representative interviewer-facilitated telephone survey (PHASE I) and secondly by redirecting these enterprises to fill in the rest of the questionnaire in a dedicated CAWI interface (PHASE II). The statistical unit was the local unit or the branch of the enterprises, and the entire universe of the survey was defined as companies having at least one employee, with market or for-profit activities and with available telephone numbers in the sampling frames used. The pilot survey was implemented in 20 selected Member States of the European Union and each country sample had a minimum of 500 interviews and a maximum of 2,000 interviews, depending on the number of active enterprises in the given country. The survey was conducted on the field between 23rd of May and 3rd of September 2012. The questionnaire was composed of a preliminary general part on the characteristics of the firms, a screener part aimed at investigating which businesses were actually victimised and which ones were not, and a main questionnaire including more detailed questions for the businesses that were actually victimised. This first draft of the questionnaire was discussed with the Steering Group of the European Commission first, and then redrafted according to the reviews made by the member of a Technical and Scientific Committee (T&S Committee) formed by a panel of experts in the field of victimisation surveys and crime and criminal justice statistics. The experts provided support in finalising the questionnaire content and tested the formulation and comprehension of the questions before the questionnaire was translated in twenty-two languages. The initial samples in Phase I were stratified samples of businesses, using disproportional allocation, to ensure over-representation of the larger enterprise segments. Criteria for stratification were the economic activity sector of the enterprise and the company size in terms of persons employed. As a result of non-response and disproportional random sampling procedures, the distribution of the achieved sample according to key variables was biased. In order to reach unbiased estimations, weights needed to be applied. For the CAWI subsamples data file, 19 weights were computed that reproduced the composition of the screener sample segments affected by crime in general and specific crimes in particular (one weight for each of the 18 types of crime). 19,039 businesses completed Phase I - CATI interview. 7,839 businesses were victimised in the last twelve months, whereas 11,200 were not. Of the 7,839 victimised ones, 2,815 completed also the Phase II - CAWI questionnaire. Details: Milan, IT: Transcrime, 2013. 138p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 31, 2014 at: http://www.transcrime.it/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/EU-BCS-Final-Report_GallupTranscrime.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Europe URL: http://www.transcrime.it/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/EU-BCS-Final-Report_GallupTranscrime.pdf Shelf Number: 132859 Keywords: Crimes Against Businesses (Europe)Financial CrimeVictimization Survey |
Author: Shetret, Liat Title: Tracking Progress: Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism in East Africa and the Greater Horn of Africa Summary: Money laundering and terrorism financing pose a significant threat to security and developmental efforts worldwide and increasingly undermine the integrity of the global financial system and its long-term stability. Many states in the Greater Horn of Africa region are experiencing rapid economic growth and have increasing access to global markets. With predominantly informal and cash-based economies, these states are particularly vulnerable to money laundering and terrorism financing activities. This vulnerability is further enhanced by absent, nascent, or incomplete financial regulatory mechanisms as well as limited law enforcement and judicial capacities to respond to violations. Poverty, weak governance, corruption, porous borders, and political instability all contribute to the enabling environment for transnational organized criminal and terrorist groups in the Greater Horn region. Although overarching regulatory frameworks and institutional capacities remain low, political interest and technical attention and resourcing is growing in the region. In particular, a willingness to engage on these issues at the national level is rising. This report provides a new assessment of developments related to anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/ CFT) efforts in East Africa and the Greater Horn region and offers a review and analysis of 10 countries: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Yemen. It builds on the 2012 baseline study, titled "ISSP-CGCC Joint Baseline Study on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism in the IGAD Subregion," and includes two additional countries, Tanzania and Yemen, because of the geographical and strategic importance of these two countries to the cross-border risks shared among Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) member states and these non-IGAD members. This report combined desk research and analysis with limited in-country visits. To the extent possible, each country's assessment covers similar areas, including a recap of the findings from the 2012 baseline study and a summary of findings and recommendations to date; a broad economic snapshot of the country and relevant political context; progress on AML/ CFT efforts, such as the national legal framework and the operationalization of a financial intelligence unit; ongoing risks and vulnerabilities, largely focused on sectoral risks and concrete implementation of legal frameworks; and emergent entry points for action and further development. Details: Goshen, IN: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2015. 104p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 23, 2015 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Tracking-Progress-low-res.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Africa URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Tracking-Progress-low-res.pdf Shelf Number: 135379 Keywords: Financial CrimeMoney Laundering (Africa)Organized CrimeTerrorismTerrorist Financing |
Author: Enste, Dominik H. Title: The shadow economy in industrial countries: Reducing the size of the shadow economy requires reducing its attractiveness while improving official institutions Summary: The shadow (underground) economy plays a major role in many countries. People evade taxes and regulations by working in the shadow economy or by employing people illegally. On the one hand, this unregulated economic activity can result in reduced tax revenue and public goods and services, lower tax morale and less tax compliance, higher control costs, and lower economic growth rates. But on the other hand, the shadow economy can be a powerful force for advancing institutional change and can boost the overall production of goods and services in the economy. The shadow economy has implications that extend beyond the economy to the political order. The shadow economy should not be seen as solely an economic problem, to be resolved by attacking the symptoms through higher fines and tougher controls. A country-specific analysis of causes and consequences is necessary in order to develop policy measures appropriate to the country's level of development. Policymakers should view illicit work as a signal of the need to decrease the attractiveness of the shadow economy through better regulation, a fair and transparent tax system, and more efficient institutions (good governance). Organized crime and illegal employment should nevertheless be fought through stricter controls and enforcement. Details: Bonn: IZA World of Labor, 2015. 10p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 24, 2015 at: http://wol.iza.org/articles/shadow-economy-in-industrial-countries-1.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://wol.iza.org/articles/shadow-economy-in-industrial-countries-1.pdf Shelf Number: 135386 Keywords: Financial CrimeIllicit WorkOrganized CrimeShadow EconomyTax EvasionUnderground Economy |
Author: Kar, Dev Title: Illicit Financial Flows to and from the Philippines: A Study in Dynamic Simulation, 1960-2011 Summary: This study presents a model of the drivers and dynamics of illicit financial flows to and from the Philippines over the period 1960-2011. Illicit flows through unrecorded balance of payments leakages and trade misinvoicing differ from broad capital flight which also includes flows of "normal" or legitimate capital. The larger implication is that models of capital flight that net out a mix of licit and illicit capital are fundamentally flawed. While legitimate capital flows that are recorded can be netted out, flows that are illicit in both directions cannot as the net result would be conceptually equivalent to net crime, an absurd concept. Hence, we argue that traditional models of capital flight understate the problem facing developing countries and they fail to acknowledge the adverse impact that flows in both directions have on them. In contrast, the narrower focus on illicit flows permits an analysis of inflows and outflows, which are treated as separate but interacting transactions that impact both the official and underground economies. Thereby the study affords a fuller understanding of how illicit flows impact a developing country. Starting with a structural equations model the estimation strategy culminates in a vector error correction procedure that yields four salient findings. First, there exists a clear link between illicit inflows and outflows with the latter possibly financing the former. Second, illicit financial inflows drive the underground economy and hamper tax collection. Third, illicit outflows of about US$4.5 billion per annum on average deplete the country's domestic savings, which could hamper sustainable economic growth in the long run. Finally, illicit flows have on average cost the government US$1.5 billion per year in lost tax revenues over the period of 2001-2011. The loss in revenues, representing about 37 percent of the social benefits budget of the consolidated state and local governments in 2011, is significant. Details: Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2014. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 5, 2015 at: http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Illicit-Financial-Flows-to-and-from-the-Philippines-Final-Report.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Philippines URL: http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Illicit-Financial-Flows-to-and-from-the-Philippines-Final-Report.pdf Shelf Number: 131843 Keywords: CorruptionFinancial CrimeMoney LaunderingTax EvasionWhite Collar Crime |
Author: Chatain, Pierre-Laurent Title: Protecting Mobile Money against Financial Crimes: Global Policy Challenges and Solutions Summary: Mobile Money is a booming industry in an increasing number of countries worldwide. The project results from increased demand for guidance and technical assistance from governments after the 2008 publication of an exploratory paper, Integrity in Mobile Phone Financial Services, which discussed mobile money and the application of international anti-money laundering (AML) and combating the financing of terrorism (CFT) standards. For most, how to craft a regulatory regime that expands access to financial services to the poor through the development of mobile phone financial services, but compliant with AML/CFT standards remains elusive. Specific AML/CFT regulations related to mobile money have not been issued in many jurisdictions, mainly due to the lack of awareness of the risks these services can pose if the right controls are not in place. Because the international standards for AML/CFT, the Financial Action Task Force's 40 + 9 Recommendations were designed and issued well before mobile money technology and business models became prevalent, even developed countries have begun to face challenges with their regulation. The project team aims to provide practical guidance to jurisdictions and the Industry on how to draft regulations and internal guidelines that allow them to comply with AML/CFT standards with enough flexibility for mobile money to thrive. Specifically, the paper (1) takes stock of new AML/CFT regulations and practices relevant to Mobile money, (2) design guidelines for drafting AML/CFT regulations that cover mobile money and (3) propose examples of best practices for the Industry to include AML/CFT in their own business model. Details: Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2011. 195p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 23, 2015 at: http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/978-0-8213-8669-9 Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/978-0-8213-8669-9 Shelf Number: 122702 Keywords: Financial CrimeMoney LaunderingTerrorist Financing |
Author: AsiaPacific Group on Money Laundering Title: APS Typology Report on Trade Based Money Laundering Summary: 1. Trade Based Money Laundering (TBML) was recognized by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in its landmark 2006 study as one of the three main methods by which criminal organizations and terrorist financiers move money for the purpose of disguising its origins and integrating it back into the formal economy. This method of money laundering (ML) is based upon abuse of trade transactions and their financing. The 2006 FATF Study highlighted the increasing attractiveness of TBML as a method for laundering funds, as controls on laundering of funds through misuse of the financial system (both formal and alternate) and through physical movement of cash (cash smuggling) become tighter. 2. In recent years APG members have continued to highlight vulnerabilities for TBML, but very few cases investigations or prosecutions appear to have been undertaken in the Asia/Pacific region and very few case studies had been shared. 3. The APG's TBML study aims to build on the existing studies, in particular those of the FATF, in order to study the extent of the prevalence of TBML and highlight current methods, techniques and modus operandi for TBML as well as to identify 'red flags' to detect and respond to TBML. 4. In determining the magnitude of TBML, the study considered why so few cases of TBML have been detected since the FATF's 2006 study. The Paper has sought to clarify and furnish explanations for terms and processes of 'trade finance' which are comprehensible to Money Laundering (ML) investigators. 5. This Paper has focused on TBML occurring in the course of international trade in goods. The study does not include in its scope capital flight, tax evasion, trade in services and domestic trade. The features of the dynamic environment that distinguish TBML from other forms of ML are its occurrence through intermingling of the trade sector with the trade finance sector in cross- border transactions. The foreign exchange market and the long supply chain make international trade particularly vulnerable to TBML. 6. The study included circulation of a questionnaire to APG and FATF members seeking statistically significant indicators. The Paper sets out a number of Case Studies to illustrate trends of TBML. Simplified explanations of the terms and processes of trade finance have been attempted through interaction with the private sector. A brief review of the literature on the subject generated by the FATF, FSRBs and other authors has been made. 7. There is a growing concern on how the rapid growth in the global economy has made international trade an increasingly attractive avenue to move illicit funds through financial transactions associated with the trade in goods and services. TBML is a complex phenomenon since its constituent elements cut across not only sectoral boundaries but also national borders. The dynamic environment of international trade allows TBML to take multiple forms. Details: Sydney: Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, 2012. 93p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 7, 2015 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Trade_Based_ML_APGReport.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Asia URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Trade_Based_ML_APGReport.pdf Shelf Number: 136353 Keywords: Financial CrimeIllegal TradeMoney LaunderingOrganized CrimeTerrorist Financing |
Author: Center for the Study of Democracy Title: Overcoming Institutional Gaps to Tackle Illicit Financing Summary: The EU legal framework requires that all Members States criminalise the financing of organised crime. According to the provisions of Article 2 (a) of the Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the fight against organised crime "Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that one or both of the following types of conduct related to a criminal organisation are regarded as offences: (a) conduct by any person who, with intent and with knowledge of either the aim and general activity of the criminal organisation or its intention to commit the offences in question, actively takes part in the organisation's criminal activities, including the provision of information or material means, the recruitment of new members and all forms of financing of its activities, knowing that such participation will contribute to the achievement of the organisation's criminal activities." Nevertheless, criminal justice authorities in Members States rarely make use of these provisions. Details: Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2015. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief No. 50: Accessed August 26, 2015 at: http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=17367 Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=17367 Shelf Number: 136589 Keywords: Financial CrimeMoney LaunderingOrganized Crime |
Author: Spanjers, Joseph Title: Illicit Financial flows and Development Indices: 2008-2012 Summary: This June 2015 report, the latest in a series by Global Financial Integrity (GFI), highlights the outsized impact that illicit financial flows have on the world's poorest economies. The study looks at illicit financial flows from some of the world's poorest nations and compares those values to some traditional indicators of development-including GDP, total trade, foreign direct investment, public expenditures on education and health services, and total tax revenue, among others-over the period 2008-2012. The report also produces several scatter plots in which illicit flows values for all developing and emerging market nations are compared to key trade indicators and various development indices, such as human development, inequality, and poverty, to determine if correlations exist between the two. By two different measures of poverty, the study reveals a positive correlation between higher levels of poverty and larger illicit outflows. That is, countries with higher levels of illicit financial flows (relative to GDP) tend to struggle with higher levels of poverty. Details: Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2015. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 16, 2015 at: http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Illicit-Financial-Flows-and-Development-Indices-2008-2012.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Illicit-Financial-Flows-and-Development-Indices-2008-2012.pdf Shelf Number: 136786 Keywords: Corruption Financial Crime Money LaunderingPovertyTax Evasion White Collar Crime |
Author: Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) Title: Tracking Anti-Corruption and Asset Recovery Commitments. A Progress Report and Recommendations for Action Summary: At the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra, Ghana in 2008, more than 1 700 participants from governments, aid agencies and civil society organizations came together to review progress on the Paris Declaration and to define the steps forward to further improve aid effectiveness. One result was the Accra Agenda for Action, in which donor countries committed themselves to fight corruption, in particular to "take steps in their own countries to combat corruption by individuals or corporations and to track, freeze, and recover illegally acquired assets." This declaration created momentum in the international fight against corruption, addressing a facet that had hitherto been largely neglected by the international development community, but which has important repercussions worldwide. Vast sums of financial assets are stolen from developing countries and hidden in financial centers around the world - money that could provide education, food or health services to the poor. Estimates reach into the hundreds of millions of dollars, and, although, there is some disagreement about these figures, it is clear that they probably exceed the level of official development assistance by a significant margin. Those stolen assets can be returned to their lawful owners and used for development programs, sending a clear message to corrupt political leaders that OECD countries are prepared to take action against corrupt practices at home. This publication reviews the compliance of 30 OECD donor countries with the anti-corruption commitments they made in Accra. It assesses progress in combating corruption and in tracking and recovering illegal assets to inform decision-makers of progress at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, which will be held in Busan in November 2011. The report shows that four countries - Australia, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States - have repatriated a total of USD $ 227 million to foreign jurisdictions between 2006 and 2009, with another two countries - France and Luxembourg - having frozen assets pending a court decision. Assets frozen total slightly over USD $ 1.2 billion. The findings of the report highlight the need to develop a concrete follow-up action plan in Busan, as most countries have not yet taken sufficient steps to translate the commitments they made in Accra into policies generating concrete results. However, positive examples show that, with strong political leadership and institutional mechanisms in place, important results can be achieved in the fight against corruption and asset recovery. Details: OECD and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2011. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative: Accessed March 30, 2016 at: https://star.worldbank.org/star/sites/star/files/Anti-corruption-and-Asset-Recovery-commitments-%28Accra%29.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: https://star.worldbank.org/star/sites/star/files/Anti-corruption-and-Asset-Recovery-commitments-%28Accra%29.pdf Shelf Number: 138496 Keywords: Asset ForfeitureCorruptionFinancial CrimeProceeds of Crime |
Author: Council of Europe. Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL) Title: Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures: Armenia Summary: This report provides a summary of the AML/CFT measures in place in Armenia as at the date of the on-site visit (25 May to 6 June 2015). It analyses the level of compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations and the level of effectiveness of Armenia's AML/CFT system, and provides recommendations on how the system could be strengthened. Key Findings - Armenia has a broadly sound legal and institutional framework to combat money laundering (ML) and financing of terrorism (FT). Armenia's level of technical compliance is generally high with respect to a large majority of FATF Recommendations. - Armenia is not an international or regional financial centre and is not believed to be at major risk of ML. The predicate offences which were identified by the 2014 national risk assessment (NRA) as posing the biggest threat are fraud (including cybercrime), tax evasion, theft and embezzlement. The findings of this assessment indicate that corruption and smuggling also constitute a ML threat. The real estate sector, the shadow economy and the use of cash all constitute significant ML vulnerabilities. Competent authorities have assessed and demonstrated an understanding of some, but not all, ML risks in Armenia. - The NRA concludes that the risk of FT is very low. Although Armenia shares a border with Iran, which is considered by the FATF to pose a higher risk of FT, the evaluation team found no concrete indications that the Armenian's private sector and non-profit organisations (NPOs) are misused for FT purposes. There have never been any investigations, prosecutions and convictions for FT. There is an effective mechanism for the implementation of Targeted Financial Sanctions (TFS). No terrorist-related funds have been frozen under the relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). - The financial intelligence unit (FIU) has access to a wide range of information sources and is very effective in generating intelligence for onward dissemination to LEAs. Law enforcement access to information is somewhat restricted by a combination of issues connected with the legislation dealing with law enforcement powers to obtain information held by financial institutions and law enforcement ability to successfully convert intelligence into evidence. Law enforcement authorities (LEAs) did not demonstrate that they make effective use of FIU notifications to develop evidence and trace criminal proceeds related to ML. - The number of ML investigations and prosecutions has increased in the period under review. However, it appears that LEAs target the comparatively easy self-laundering cases mainly involving domestic predicate offences. One ML conviction (described as autonomous) was secured, although the judiciary appears to have based its ruling on the admission that the predicate offence had been committed. Overall, law enforcement efforts to pursue ML are not fully commensurate with the ML risks faced by the country. - Seizure and confiscation of criminal proceeds, instrumentalities and property of equivalent value are not pursued as a policy objective. It is doubtful whether LEAs are in a position to effectively identify, trace and seize assets at the earliest stages of an investigation, since proactive parallel financial investigations for ML and predicate offences are not conducted on a regular basis. - The banking sector is the most important sector in terms of materiality. Banks understand the risks that apply to them according to the FATF Standards and the AML/CFT Law. However, they have not demonstrated that they have incorporated the risks identified in the NRA into their internal policies. The real estate sector, notaries and casinos pose a relatively higher risk compared to other DNFBPs. Their understanding of risk - The application of customer due diligence (CDD), record-keeping and reporting measures by financial institutions is adequate. Major improvements are needed by the DNFBP sector with respect to preventive measures. - The approach of the Central Bank of Armenia (CBA) to anti-money laundering/counter financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) supervision is to some extent based on risk. Developments in this area are on-going. Adequate procedures for the imposition of sanctions are in place. However, the level of fines could be improved. The supervision of the DNFBP sector was found to be in need of improvement relative to casinos and notaries, and inadequate relative to real estate agents, dealers in precious metals and stones, lawyers and accountants. - Most basic information on legal persons is publicly available through the State Register. All legal persons in Armenia are required to disclose the identity of their beneficial owners to the State Register upon registration and, inter alia, whenever there is a change in shareholding. Information on beneficial ownership of legal entities is also ensured through the application of CDD measures by banks. - While all the banks understand that they have to apply freezing of funds to proliferation financing and there is an innovative system in place in financial institutions to ensure that matches are detected, there is a concern that the legal framework based on the AML/CFT Law could be open to legal challenge. Coordination between the different competent authorities involved in this area needs to be further developed. Details: Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2015. 182p. Source: Internet Resource: Fifth Round Mutual Evaluation Report: Accessed April 26, 2016 at: https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/Evaluations/round5/MONEYVAL(2015)34_5thR_MER_Armenia.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Armenia URL: https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/Evaluations/round5/MONEYVAL(2015)34_5thR_MER_Armenia.pdf Shelf Number: 138814 Keywords: BanksFinancial CrimeMoney LaunderingTerrorist Financing |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Financial Institutions: Fines, Penalties, and Forfeitures for Violations of Financial Crimes and Sanctions Requirements Summary: Over the last few years, billions of dollars have been collected in fines, penalties, and forfeitures assessed against financial institutions for violations of requirements related to financial crimes. These requirements are significant tools that help the federal government detect and disrupt money laundering, terrorist financing, bribery, corruption, and violations of U.S. sanctions programs. GAO was asked to review the collection and use of these fines, penalties , and forfeitures assessed against financial institutions for violations of these requirements - specifically, BSA/AML, FCPA, and U.S. sanctions programs requirements . T his report describes (1) the amounts collected by the federal government for these violations , and (2) the process for collecting these funds and the purposes for which they are used. GAO analyzed agency data, reviewed documentation on agency collection processes and on authorized uses of the funds in which collections are deposited, and reviewed relevant laws. GAO also interviewed officials from Treasury (including the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network and the Office of Foreign Assets Control ), Securities and Exchange Commission, Department of Justice, and the federal banking regulators. GAO is not making r ecommendations in this report Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2016. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-16-297: Accessed August 2, 2016 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/675987.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/675987.pdf Shelf Number: 139943 Keywords: Criminal FinesEconomic CrimesFinancial CrimeMoney Laundering |
Author: Rosemont, Hugo Title: Public-Private Security Cooperation: From Cyber to Financial Crime Summary: Over the past two years, there has been considerable focus in the UK on developing a strategic and tactical partnership between the public and private sectors in order to achieve a step-change in the country's response to financial crime. Speaking at RUSI in June 2014, Theresa May, the then home secretary, emphasised the importance of the partnership between private sector companies and law enforcement to tackling financial crime, preventing money laundering and recovering the proceeds of crime. The result: the formation of the Financial Sector Forum and the creation of the Joint Money Laundering Intelligence Taskforce (JMLIT), a public-private partnership dedicated to collaboration in order to enhance the national response to financial crime. While this nascent effort appears to be gaining traction, and the JMLIT is being moved to a permanent footing, it is certainly not the first such initiative to be established. This paper from RUSI's Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies considers lessons that can be learnt from the establishment of previous public-private partnerships, in particular the Cyber-security Information Sharing Partnership (CiSP). The author stresses the importance of establishing measurable objectives that are co-designed and agreed upon from the outset. Too often such partnerships, established in good faith and with undoubted commitment, fade as the initial enthusiasm wanes, staff are reassigned, and those contributing time and resources question the value of their commitment. As the UK's JMLIT emerges from its pilot phase, the longevity of this initiative will be challenged as its initial momentum fades. It is therefore critical that the JMLIT draws on the experience of other, similarly important public-private sector security partnerships in order to anticipate and address the challenges it might face as it matures. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2016. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: RUSI Occasional paper: Accessed September 2, 2016 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/op_201608_rosemont_public-private_security_cooperation1.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/op_201608_rosemont_public-private_security_cooperation1.pdf Shelf Number: 140119 Keywords: CybercrimeFinancial CrimeMoney LaunderingPartnershipsPrivate SecuritySecurity |
Author: Bromberg, Lev Title: Sanctions Imposed for Insider Trading in Australia, , Canada (Ontario), Hong Kong, Singapore, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States: An Empirical Study Summary: This working paper presents the results of a detailed comparative empirical study of sanctions imposed for insider trading in Australia, Canada (Ontario), Hong Kong, Singapore, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Insider trading is considered to be a serious form of misconduct and has in some cases resulted in defendants receiving lengthy custodial sentences and significant monetary sanctions. The comparative study is based on a dataset of a significant size, scope and comprehensiveness, encompassing nearly 700 individuals and companies, as well as approximately 1400 sanctions imposed for the contravention of insider trading provisions in the seven jurisdictions. The study provides a detailed analysis of the insider trading enforcement landscape across a range of common law jurisdictions over an extended period by examining custodial sentences, banning orders and various pecuniary sanctions imposed for insider trading during the seven year period from 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2015 Details: Melbourne: University of Melbourne - Law School; Centre for International Finance and Regulation (CIFR), 2016. 51p. Source: Internet Resource: CIFR Paper No. 117/2016 : Accessed September 15, 2016 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2817172 Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2817172 Shelf Number: 147881 Keywords: Financial CrimeInsider TradingWhite-Collar Crime |
Author: International Monetary Fund Title: Canada: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism Summary: This report provides a summary of the anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) measures in place in Canada as at the date of the onsite visit (November 3 to 20, 2015). It analyzes the level of compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations and the level of effectiveness of Canada's AML/CFT system, and provides recommendations on how the system could be strengthened Details: Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2016. 217p. Source: Internet Resource: Country Report No. 16/294: Accessed October 7, 2016 at: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2016/cr16294.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Canada URL: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2016/cr16294.pdf Shelf Number: 145109 Keywords: Financial crimeMoney LaunderingTerrorism Financing |
Author: Caribbean Financial Action Task Force Title: Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures Trinidad and Tobago Mutual Evaluation Report Summary: 1. This report provides a summary of the anti-money laundering (AML)/ countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) measures in place in Trinidad and Tobago as at the date of the on-site visit of January 12-23, 2015. It analyses the level of compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations and the level of effectiveness of Trinidad and Tobago's AML/CFT system, and provides recommendations on how the system could be strengthened. A. Risks and General Situation 2. Trinidad and Tobago is currently undertaking its National Risk Assessment (NRA) in relation to money laundering (ML)/ terrorist financing (TF). At the time of the on-site, Trinidad and Tobago had commenced, but not completed its NRA. Draft sector reports had been compiled and preliminary results had been communicated to the relevant sectors, however the Authorities advised that the draft reports could not be shared with the Assessors at that time. The National Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Financing of Terrorism Committee (NAMLC) advised that Trinidad and Tobago was in the process of reviewing, consulting on and finalizing the collated Report before sending to the World Bank. The different Competent Authorities (CAs) including law enforcement authorities (LEAs) have indicated to the Assessors that they are aware of the risk ML and predicate offences pose to the jurisdiction. However no documentation was produced to substantiate the information provided by law enforcement in this regard. The Financial Intelligence Unit of Trinidad and Tobago (FIUTT) produced information to show that the predicate offences of Tax Evasion, Fraud and Drug Trafficking are some of the highest generators of the proceeds of crime as a result of the suspicious transaction reports (STRs)/ suspicious activity reports (SARs) submitted to the FIUTT. The Assessors were informed that the location of the jurisdiction and its nexus to international trade also makes it vulnerable to cross-border ML risks. The information reflected the volume of currency declarations that were submitted by the Customs and Excise Division to the FIUTT along with the number of cash seizures that occurred throughout the port. The information provided to the Assessors shows that Money Value Transfer Service (MVTS) providers are second only to the banks in filing STRs/SARs to the FIUTT. The large volume of currency declarations being reported to the FIUTT by the Customs and Excise Department coupled with the increasing amount of reports the FIUTT has been receiving from the MVTS providers and the monetary value of cash seized by the Customs and Excise Division are indicators that significant amount of monies are being moved across the border. 3. The offence of Terrorism is not unknown to the jurisdiction. Law Enforcement and Intelligence Officials have indicated that nationals of Trinidad and Tobago are currently being held in Venezuela on suspected terrorist activity offences. The information provided to the Assessors also indicated that Trinidad and Tobago has extradited one of its nationals to New York, USA for terrorist related activities. Currently, LEAs and other intelligence agencies within the jurisdiction have intelligence information to suggest that its nationals are travelling to places such as Syria to fight with terrorist organisations such as ISIS/ISIL. The FIUTT has received information in the form of STRs/SARs which may indicate that some legal entities are engaged in conducting businesses with entities that may be involved in terrorism activities. B. Key Findings Overall Level of Compliance and Effectiveness - Identifying, assessing and understanding risk: Trinidad and Tobago is currently conducting its NRA in collaboration with the World Bank. This assessment is being spearheaded by NAMLC. The Assessors note that Trinidad and Tobago's understanding of risk is limited and there has been varied assessments of such risk by CAs. The NRA, therefore, would be helpful in assisting Trinidad and Tobago with identifying, assessing and mitigating the risk posed by ML/TF. - The Limited Use of Financial Intelligence: Trinidad and Tobago has robust legislation that allows for LEAs to gather financial intelligence and information to investigate ML, TF and associated predicate offences. These enactments being the POCA and the ATA also provides for the LEAs to trace, restrain and confiscate the proceeds of crime. The FIUA allows for the FIUTT to receive, analyse and disseminate financial information to the relevant LEAs. The FIUTT has disseminated several Intelligence Reports (IRs) to LEAs as part of its mandate. Three of these reports have led to the arrest and prosecution of five individuals for ML offences. However, the Assessors observed that a large number of SARs received by the FIUTT are still awaiting analysis or have been filed for intelligence purposes. It should also be noted that a number of the IRs disseminated to the Financial Investigations Branch (FIB) are still under investigation. The Assessors were informed that there has been an improvement in the quality of IRs submitted by the FIUTT as of 2014. - Money Laundering Investigation and Prosecution: LEAs in Trinidad and Tobago considered the risk associated with ML as being medium to high. The jurisdiction has recorded three cases of ML that have resulted in charges being brought against five individuals. The cases are currently pending before the Court. The information provided indicates that these cases were as a result of parallel investigations conducted between the FIB and the Fraud Squad. There are no arrests for stand-alone ML. The investigation of ML is not properly prioritized by LEAs. The lack of ML arrests coupled with the risks associated with the jurisdiction along with the lack of priority given to investigation suggests that the offence of ML is not properly investigated. Furthermore, none of the cases for which persons have been charged with ML have been adjudicated by the Court and this therefore creates a difficulty in determining whether these cases have been properly investigated. In the absence of convictions for ML, it is not possible to say conclusively that matters are being properly investigated. The absence of convictions for the offence of ML means that no sanctions have been applied by the Court. The offence of ML is not given priority within the Court system. - Confiscation: Confiscation is not treated with priority within Trinidad and Tobago. Trinidad and Tobago does not have any confiscation proceedings pertaining to ML, TF or any predicate offences. Recent changes to the POCA have created a loophole whereby confiscation may not be possible if the criminal ML conduct is not linked to a specified offence. - The Seized Assets Fund (SAF) which is for monies seized under the POCA and the ATA has not been properly established as persons have not been appointed to the Seized Assets Committee and Regulations governing the management and operation of the fund have not as yet been developed. - Terrorist Financing: The offence of terrorist financing has been adequately criminalised in the ATA and related regulations. The FIUTT has mandated in its Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) that STRs relating to TF are to be given priority and outlines the procedure upon receipt of these STRs. The Assessors were informed that these IRs were delivered to the relevant person within the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS). There has been no feedback to the FIUTT in relation to these IRs. The Assessors note that a report of TF was submitted since 2013 and there is no evidence to suggest that any actions have been taken against the individuals or entities mentioned in the report. There is no indication that TF is prioritized and properly investigated by LEAs as there has been no designation of entities or persons as terrorists, no assets restrained nor any arrests or convictions for TF offences. The framework for targeted sanctions related to the financing of terrorism needs to be significantly tightened up. There are not adequate sanctions or prohibitions in respect of making funds or facilities available to designated persons and all the requirements for freezing funds are not covered in the ATA. There is no comprehensive policy on the proliferation of financing of weapons of mass destruction and there is no adequate legislation on this issue. There does not appear to be a thorough appreciation of the risk of TF amongst the relevant authorities. There are inadequate resources to effectively investigate and prosecute TF. - Non Profit Organisations (NPOs): NPOs are required to register with the Registrar General's Department however there is no proper AML/CTF policy in relation to the management, supervision and monitoring of these entities. A targeted risk assessment for these entities has not been done as yet, neither are there adequate laws to address this area which means that for most intents and purposes the sector is not being sufficiently regulated. - Preventive Measures - The regulatory framework in relation to preventive measures is largely in place as demonstrated by the level of technical compliance by Trinidad and Tobago. However, significant gaps exist in the manner in which FIs and listed businesses (LBs) in Trinidad and Tobago implement these requirements. Gaps exist in understanding risk, applying enhanced due diligence to PEPS, internal controls and performance of CDD measures based on risk. - Supervision - The supervisory regime undertaken by the Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago (CBTT) is robust and well developed given that it has had significantly more years of experience than the other CAs. Supervision performed by the CBTT is sound. Additionally, the FIUTT as a supervisor has demonstrated its capabilities while the Trinidad and Tobago Securities and Exchange Commission (TTSEC) has only recently begun direct AML/CFT supervision. Except for the CBTT there are issues of resources and expertise. Across the board, Regulators have not demonstrated sufficient understanding of risk and applied that understanding to how they regulate on a risk sensitive basis. Sanctions imposed by supervisors have been limited and the range of sanctions available have not been utilised adequately by supervisors. Supervisors need to consider wider use of those powers as well as seeking additional powers such as the ability to impose monetary administrative penalties. - National AML/CFT Policies and Coordination - There is an overall AML/CFT framework in place. The framework is coordinated by the NAMLC. Domestic coordination occurring amongst the key stakeholders has resulted in a number of positive strides within the AML/CFT framework. However, all sectors have not been covered in terms of articulation and thorough dissemination of the AML/CFT policy and in assessing and understanding the country-wide risks. There is need for greater resources to be invested so that all the key agencies are sufficiently funded. - Legal Persons and Legal Arrangements - Trinidad and Tobago is a thriving centre for commercial activity. It has a very active Registrar General's Department (RGD) that oversees the registration of companies, NPOs and the registration of business names amongst other functions. A publicly searchable electronic database for general records of the RGD has been invaluable in increasing accessibility to basic information on companies. Some beneficial ownership information is kept and made available but the accuracy of this is questionable since there is no requirement in the Companies Act to demand and maintain such information. Trinidad and Tobago is not a major centre for legal arrangements. Recent improvements in the filing of annual returns has improved the accuracy of records within the RGD and the verification process but there is still significant room for improvement. No risk analysis pertaining to legal arrangements has been done. - International Cooperation - FIUTT has been working effectively to use mechanisms to share, exchange and respond to requests for information. The FIUTT is able to share information spontaneously. LEAs have not maximised the possibility of exchanging information with their foreign counterparts. Both the BIR and the Customs and Excise Division have limitations in providing or obtaining information from foreign counterparts. Requests for information are not always processed in a timely manner. All the provisions of the Vienna Convention, the Merida Convention, the Terrorist Financing Convention and the Palermo Convention need to be given effect to. A proper case management system does not exist for either mutual legal assistance or extradition cases. There are some limitations in the Mutual Legal Assistance Act that may affect the provision of information. Details: Trinidad & Tobago, West Indies: Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, 2016. 173p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 15, 2016 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer-fsrb/cfatf-4mer-trinidad-tobago.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Trinidad and Tobago URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer-fsrb/cfatf-4mer-trinidad-tobago.pdf Shelf Number: 140758 Keywords: Financial CrimeMoney LaunderingTerrorist Financing |
Author: GAFISUD Title: GAFISUD - 2010 Regional Typologies Summary: The document: "REGIONAL TYPOLOGIES - GAFISUD 2010" was drafted by the International Financial Action Task Force of South America [Grupo de Accion Financiera Internacional de Sudamerica] - GAFISUD, in cooperation with the GAFISUD- European Union Project. It is classified as a document of PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE. Consequently, its content may be consulted and utilized by any person, with copyright limitations. As a result of the aforesaid, its reproduction, copy, distribution, etc., in whole or in part, requires GAFISUD's previous authorization. The pertinent request may be addressed to the email: contacto@gafisud.info This document presents some of the mostly used money laundering and terrorist financing methodologies, with the aim of helping the region's reporting entities and the society as a whole in the preventive actions of behaviours associated with money laundering and the financing of crime organizations. This information will allow designing better instruments of control and red flags that will enable authorities to devise or adjust control mechanisms with the purpose of protecting themselves against money launderers or the financing of terrorist groups. The descriptions and examples are based on real facts. However, all such data that may identify situations, individuals or places and additional elements have been amended in order to avoid any search and seizure, damage or breach of material rights. The statements on economic activities do not constitute a conjecture or forecast about truthful and permanent bonds with activities tied to money laundering and terrorist financing. The described behaviour or typology only shows a tendency and the existing risk within the economic activity of being used by individuals engaged in money laundering or terrorist financing. Details: s.l. GAFISUD, 2010. 54p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 17, 2016 at: http://www.cocaineroute.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Regional-Typologies-2010.pdf Year: 2010 Country: South America URL: http://www.cocaineroute.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Regional-Typologies-2010.pdf Shelf Number: 144869 Keywords: Financial CrimeMoney LaunderingTerrorist Financing |
Author: Chiarini, Bruno Title: Is the Severity of the Penalty an Effective Deterrent? A Strategic Approach for the Crime of Tax Evasion Summary: In order to analyze the severity of sentencing, and to show how the probabilistic interpretation of strategic behavior can be tricky, this paper uses the crime strategic model (inspection game) proposed by Tsebelis. This model shows that any attempts to increase the severity of punishment will alter the payoff of the individuals involved, leaving unchanged the frequency of violation at equilibrium. This result is misleading: payoffs are not independent and the crime game can not be simply read with mixed strategies. These are inconclusive on how the players act rationally. This is undeniably true for the crime of tax evasion, where the dishonest taxpayers are rational agents, motivated by the comparison of payoffs, considering the risk of breaking the law. Although an irreducible minimum of uncertainty remains, the Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies provides us with the necessary information on equilibria in pure strategies that will be played. In this context, tougher sentencing deters crime, although, as the Italian historical experience teaches, the necessary condition required is the certainty of punishment and the ability of the government to enforce it. Details: Munich: Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute (CESifo, 2016. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: CESifo Working Paper No. 6112: Accessed October 19, 2016 at: https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_6112.html Year: 2016 Country: Italy URL: https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_6112.html Shelf Number: 145894 Keywords: DeterrenceFinancial CrimePunishmentTax EvasionWhite-Collar Crime |
Author: AUSTRAC Title: Australia's Superannuation Section: Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment Summary: AUSTRAC assesses the overall money laundering and terrorism financing (ML/TF) risk for the superannuation sector as MEDIUM. This rating is based on an assessment of the criminal threat environment, the vulnerabilities within the sector, and the consequences or harms associated with the criminal threat. This assessment relates to superannuation funds regulated by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA). The criminal threat environment is varied and multifaceted, ranging from opportunistic offences conducted by individual members, to complex and sophisticated attacks executed by organised crime groups, including from entities based overseas. The size of the superannuation sector ($1.26 trillion in assets)1 makes it an attractive target for money laundering and associated predicate crimes. Fraud is by far the most prevalent predicate crime, with many reported cases of falsified documents and attempted illegal early release of superannuation savings. Many cases of fraud are enabled by cybercrime, with funds observing regular and sophisticated hacking attempts. Terrorism financing is a limited but emerging threat. Foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), who are generally self funded, have accessed superannuation accounts to finance their activities. The specific characteristics of the superannuation sector that make it vulnerable to ML/TF and predicate crimes include: • the extremely large number of member accounts and volume of transactions • low levels of member engagement, which hampers timely detection of fraud • post-preservation accounts which have few restrictions on making transactions to and from the accounts • voluntary contributions to accumulation accounts by members, where the source of money is difficult to verify • payments to members and outgoing rollovers that are vulnerable to fraud and illegal early release • the growing reliance on online delivery of products and services, resulting in less face-toface interaction with customers and increasing online data storage. Details: West Chatswood, NSW: AUSTRAC, 2016. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 10, 2016 at: http://austrac.gov.au/sites/default/files/super-annuation-risk-assessment-WEB.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://austrac.gov.au/sites/default/files/super-annuation-risk-assessment-WEB.pdf Shelf Number: 140411 Keywords: Financial CrimeMoney LaunderingRisk AssessmentTerrorist Financing |
Author: Collin, Matthew Title: The Impact of Anti-Money Laundering Regulation on Payment Flows: Evidence from SWIFT Data Summary: Regulatory pressure on international banks to fight money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) increased substantially in the past decade. At the same time there has been a rise in the number of complaints of banks denying transactions or closing the accounts of customers either based in high risk countries or attempting to send money there, a process known as de-risking. In this paper, we investigate the impact of an increase in regulatory risk, driven by the inclusion of countries on an internationally-recognized list of high risk jurisdictions, on subsequent cross-border payments. We find countries that have been added to a high risk greylist face up to a 10% decline in the number of cross border payments received from other jurisdictions, but no change in the number sent. We also find that a greylisted country is more likely to see a decline in payments from other countries with weak AML/CFT institutions. We find limited evidence that these effects manifest in cross border trade or other flows. Given that countries that are placed on these lists tend to be poorer on average, these impacts are likely to be more strongly felt in developing countries. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2016. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper 445: Accessed January 27, 2017 at: http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/impact-anti-money-laundering-SWIFT-data.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/impact-anti-money-laundering-SWIFT-data.pdf Shelf Number: 145092 Keywords: Financial CrimeMoney LaunderingTerrorist FinancingWhite Collar Crime |
Author: Shores, Michael Title: Informal Networks and White Collar Crime: An Extended Analysis of the Madoff Scandal Summary: Understanding the nature of white collar crime is a central issue in public policy. Testing the theories presented by Benson, Madensen and Eck (2009), I examine the role of informal religious networks in the criminal activity of Bernard Madoff, perpetrator of one of the largest white collar crimes in United States history. In contrast to previous studies that suggest that religion may reduce the incidence of criminal behavior, I show that the opposite can also be true. Most white collar crimes, like those perpetrated by Madoff, are exploitations of trust, which can be fostered by a shared religious identity between the victim and perpetrator. Using data from the National Center of Charitable Statistics, I construct two measures of Jewish religious network strength at the county level: the concentration of Jewish non-profit organizations and the revenue of Jewish non-profit organizations. Additionally, using data from the Jewish Community Center Association of North America and several U.S. Kosher certification organizations, I construct the number of Jewish community centers and the number of kosher restaurants per county. I show that conditional on the number of high income individuals in a county, residents of counties in which there were stronger Jewish networks were more likely to have been victimized by Madoff. In addition, I show that residents of areas where Madoff lived or worked were more likely to be victims, but that Jewish network strength appears to counteract this "distance effect." Non-profit organizations, which were also victims of Madoff, were less affected by the strength of this informal network. Details: Ithaca, NY: Department of Policy Analysis & Management Cornell University, 2010. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed February 28, 2017 at: https://ecommons.cornell.edu/bitstream/handle/1813/15068/Michael%20Shores%20May10%20thesis.pdf?sequence=2 Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: https://ecommons.cornell.edu/bitstream/handle/1813/15068/Michael%20Shores%20May10%20thesis.pdf?sequence=2 Shelf Number: 141253 Keywords: Criminal NetworksFinancial CrimeFraudWhite Collar Crime |
Author: Goldman, Zachary K. Title: Terrorist Use of Virtual Currencies: Containing the Potential Threat Summary: This paper explores the risk that virtual currencies (VCs) may become involved in the financing of terrorism at a significant scale. VCs and associated technologies hold great promise for low cost, high speed, verified transactions that can unite counterparties around the world. For this reason they could appear appealing to terrorist groups (as they are at present to cybercriminals). Currently, however, there is no more than anecdotal evidence that terrorist groups have used virtual currencies to support themselves. Terrorists in the Gaza Strip have used virtual currencies to fund operations, and Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) members and supporters have been particularly receptive to the new technology, with recorded uses in Indonesia and the United States. Most terrorist funding now occurs through traditional methods such as the hawala system, an often informal and cash-based money transfer mechanism, and established financial channels. If VCs become sufficiently liquid and easily convertible, however, and if terrorist groups in places such as sub-Saharan Africa, Yemen, and the Horn of Africa obtain the kinds of technical infrastructure needed to support VC activity, then the threat may become more significant. The task of the law enforcement, intelligence, regulatory, and financial services communities, therefore, must be to prevent terrorist groups from using VCs at scale. The use of VCs by "lone wolf" terrorists - a much bigger potential threat because of the small scales of funding needed to execute an attack - represents the kind of problem in intelligence and digital forensics that law enforcement agencies are well equipped to handle, even if they tax existing resources. Attacking terrorists' use of virtual currency at scale is a challenging task for many stakeholders. New financial technology firms often lack the resources to comply effectively with oversight obligations, while regulators have tended to devote few resources to non-bank institutions. At the same time, different countries have adopted varying approaches to the regulation of virtual currencies, posing an enforcement challenge in a globalized field that requires a unified response. Finally, the privileging of prevention over management of illicit finance risk in the compliance world has created an incentive structure for banks that does not, ironically, push them toward innovative approaches to countering terrorist financing, including via virtual currencies. The counterterrorist financing community should adopt three guiding principles that will provide the foundation for policies aimed at countering both the new virtual currency threat and the broader illicit finance danger. First, policy leaders should prioritize the countering of terrorist financing over other kinds of financial crime. Second, the policy and regulatory posture should be oriented toward rewarding and incentivizing innovation. Third, policymakers should emphasize and create a practical basis for strengthening coordination between the public and private sectors on terrorist financing. These approaches form the foundation of an effective response to existing and emerging terrorist financing threats and will balance the burden of regulatory compliance with the policy need to support innovative new virtual currency technologies. Details: Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security (CNAS), 2017. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 12, 2017 at: http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/CNAS-Report-TerroristFinancing-Final.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/CNAS-Report-TerroristFinancing-Final.pdf Shelf Number: 145453 Keywords: Cybercrime Financial CrimeTerrorism Terrorist Financing Terrorists Virtual Currencies |
Author: Traub, Amy Title: The Steal: The Urgent Need to Combat Wage Theft in Retail Summary: Retailers put a great deal of resources into dealing with theft. They install security cameras, affix anti-theft tags to merchandise, and hire guards to protect stores. Signs warn that shoplifters will be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. And yet another type of theft in the retail sector receives far less attention, even though it is equally, if not more pervasive in our economy: employers stealing pay they legally owe to their workforce. Details: New York: Demos, 2017. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 15, 2017 at: http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/The%20Steal%20-%20Retail%20Wage%20Theft.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/The%20Steal%20-%20Retail%20Wage%20Theft.pdf Shelf Number: 146180 Keywords: Corporate Crime Financial CrimeWage Theft |
Author: Alstadsaeter, Annette Title: Tax Evasion and Inequality Summary: This paper attempts to estimate the size and distribution of tax evasion in rich countries. We combine random audits - the key source used to study tax evasion so far - with new micro-data leaked from large offshore financial institutions - HSBC Switzerland ("Swiss leaks") and Mossack Fonseca ("Panama Papers" ) - matched to population-wide wealth records in Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. We find that tax evasion rises sharply with wealth, a phenomenon random audits fail to capture. On average about 3% of personal taxes are evaded in Scandinavia, but this figure rises to close to 30% in the top 0.01% of the wealth distribution, a group that includes households with more than $45 million in net wealth. A simple model of the supply of tax evasion services can explain why evasion rises steeply with wealth. Taking tax evasion into account increases the rise in inequality seen in tax data since the 1970s markedly, highlighting the need to move beyond tax data to capture income and wealth at the top, even in countries where tax compliance is generally high. We also find that after reducing tax evasion - by using tax amnesties - tax evaders do not legally avoid taxes more. This result suggests that fighting tax evasion can be an effective way to collect more tax revenue from the very wealthy. Details: Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: NBER Working Paper No. 23772: Accessed September 11, 2017 at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w23772.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w23772.pdf Shelf Number: 147208 Keywords: Financial CrimeInequalityTax Evasion |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Anti-Money Laundering: U.S. Efforts to Combat Narcotics-Related Money Laundering in the Western Hemisphere Summary: Proceeds from narcotics-related illicit activities are one of the most common sources of money laundering in the United States. Though difficult to accurately determine, in 2015, Treasury estimated that drug trafficking generated about $64 billion annually from U.S. sales. Moreover, the Western Hemisphere accounts for about a third of the jurisdictions designated by State as of primary concern for money laundering. GAO was asked to provide information on U.S. efforts to impede illicit proceeds from drug trafficking from entering the financial systems of the United States and other Western Hemisphere countries. This report describes (1) U.S. agency oversight and monitoring of compliance with the BSA, including collaboration with counterparts in other Western Hemisphere countries, and (2) State's and Treasury's efforts to build capacity in other Western Hemisphere countries to combat narcotics-related money laundering. GAO reviewed laws and regulations; interviewed experts and U.S. officials; reviewed documents and examined State's and Treasury's budget data for fiscal years 2011 through 2015, the most recent at the time of the review, for anti-money laundering activities. GAO selected Colombia, Mexico, and Panama - three principal recipients of AML support - for site visits, in part, because each country was designated a major drug transit or illicit drug-producing country from fiscal years 2014 through 2016. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2017. 67p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-17-684: Accessed September 11, 2017 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/686727.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/686727.pdf Shelf Number: 147217 Keywords: Anti-Money LaunderingDrug TraffickingFinancial CrimeMoney LaunderingProceeds of Crime |
Author: Snead, Jason Title: An Overview of Recent State-Level Forfeiture Reforms Summary: Civil asset forfeiture laws allow for the seizure of property suspected of having been involved in, or derived from, criminal activity. In most states and at the federal level, no criminal charges or convictions are necessary because the resulting civil proceeding targets the property - not its owner. Civil forfeiture laws grant individuals challenging forfeiture cases considerably fewer legal protections than they would enjoy if they were defendants in criminal cases, and allow the law enforcement agencies that execute the seizures to retain the proceeds of successful forfeitures, creating a significant incentive to seize property. For decades, states have expanded the scope and reach of civil forfeiture, but within the past few years-driven by a growing number of accounts of abusive forfeitures and a recognition of the power of the forfeiture funding mechanism to distort the priorities of law enforcement organizations - many have reevaluated their civil forfeiture laws, scaling back or totally abolishing the tool. The message is clear: outside the law enforcement community, there is little support for the forfeiture status quo. Details: Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2016. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: Backgrounder: Accessed September 18, 2017 at: http://www.heritage.org/crime-and-justice/report/overview-recent-state-level-forfeiture-reforms Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: http://www.heritage.org/crime-and-justice/report/overview-recent-state-level-forfeiture-reforms Shelf Number: 147382 Keywords: Asset ForfeitureFinancial CrimeProceeds of Crime |
Author: Zerzan, Andrew Title: Policing Financial Services: Surveying the Anti-Money Laundering Regulatory Regime Summary: The anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism international (AML/CFT) standards were created over twenty years ago by the world's biggest economies. Since then, the standards have become increasingly implemented globally. They have established a regulatory regime in which many different public institutions play a role. The majority of these public institutions are not traditionally involved in crime fighting or counter-terrorism so certain challenges exist, especially for those in developing countries. For instance, the AML/CFT rules dictate how people of all types can connect - or not connect - to the financial sector. The paper provides an overview of what the standards mean for public institutions and highlights challenges that have surfaced to date. The intended audience is the development community so that it is better informed in its efforts to improve the application and revision of the standards, which is currently underway. High-level findings: The regime that countries must put in place is complex and there are many interdependencies. The effectiveness of the system relies highly on ensuring that all key elements are in place. If one part of the system is missing, it is likely to greatly hinder effectiveness of the rest. Interaction between the standard setter and developing countries, especially the poorest, is very little. There has been some improvement in dialogue via intermediary organizations but a direct link has not been established. This will have an impact on how the standards are written as well as their effectiveness in these countries. Interpretation of the standards has prompted countries to create regulatory frameworks that are highly data-driven. This means that effectiveness hinges greatly on a country's ability to both collect data from a great number of sources as well as analyze it. Whether this is the right approach for developing countries with low capacity needs to be assessed. Details: London: GSMA, 2011. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 30, 2017 at: http://www.t.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/policingfinancialservicessurveyingtheantimoneylaunderingregulatoryregime2011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.t.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/policingfinancialservicessurveyingtheantimoneylaunderingregulatoryregime2011.pdf Shelf Number: 147516 Keywords: Counter-terrorismFinancial CrimeMoney LaunderingTerrorist Financing |
Author: AUSTRAC Title: Stored Value Cards: Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment Summary: AUSTRAC assessed the overall ML/TF risk associated with the use of stored value cards (SVCs) to be medium, and their vulnerability to criminal misuse to be high. The report found that the risk level of individual SVCs varies significantly depending on the features of the specific product. Travel cards that can be reloaded and redeemed offshore in cash carry significantly higher levels of risk than low value retail gift cards. The most common crime-types in which SVCs are implicated are money laundering and cyber-enabled fraud. Of particular concern is the use of SVCs for terrorism financing purposes. The risk assessment contains detailed information to assist industry understand the risks associated with SVCs and how they can mitigate these risks. Details: Canberra: AUSTRAC, 2017. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 20, 2017 at: http://www.austrac.gov.au/sites/default/files/stored-value-cards-risk-assessment-WEB.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: http://www.austrac.gov.au/sites/default/files/stored-value-cards-risk-assessment-WEB.pdf Shelf Number: 148274 Keywords: Credit Card FraudFinancial CrimeMoney LaunderingRisk AssessmentTerrorist Financing |
Author: Salcedo-Albaran, Eduardo Title: The Lava Jato Network: Corruption and Money Laundering in Brazil Summary: The "Lava Jato" Operation is an on-going Federal Police investigation executed for dismantling corruption and money laundering schemes that involved Petrobras, the Brazilian State-managed oil company, Electrobras, the Brazilian state-managed nuclear company, among other Brazilian public institutions. From 2014 to mid-2017, this operation has developed 41 phases of investigation involving various public and private companies, politicians, businesspersons, doleiros, and drug traffickers, among other types of agents. Since the initial complaint filed by Hermes Freitas Magnus, who owned the Brazilian company "Dunel", along with Maria Teodora Silva, a series of investigations began, which allowed identifying four large criminal groups led by the currency exchange operators Carlos Habib Chater, Alberto Youssef, Nelma Mitsue Penasso Kodama and Raul Henrique Srour. As a result of these investigations, Brazilian officials discovered that those four criminal organizations operated together between 2005 and 2014 to launder money through alliances between companies and to obtain contracts with Petrobras through bribe payments to public officers of the company, and politicians with the power of keeping the officials on their positions. The evidence gathered and analyzed for this report revealed a major scheme of corruption and money laundering in Brazil, involving more than 220 Brazilian and foreign companies, 170 business persons, and 100 public servants. Considering the institutional impact of the criminal scheme installed initially at Petrobras, and how it engaged on corruption across Latin America and money laundering across the Western Hemisphere and beyond, this document is the centralized analysis of this complex criminal structure, according to the sources listed below. This document has five sections. The first part is this introduction; the second is a description of the methodology and the concepts related to Social Network Analysis and additional protocols of analysis, which is the methodological approach herein applied; the third is a brief presentation of the criminal structure referenced here as "Petrobras Criminal Network", as well as the sources gathered and processed to model the structure; the fourth is an analysis of the characteristics of the criminal structure, which includes a description of the types of nodes/agents, the types of interactions established, and the nodes/agents concentrating direct interactions and the capacity to arbitrate resources across the network; and the fifth part includes conclusions related to the characteristics of the analyzed network. Details: Bogota, Colombia/Sao Paulo, Brazil: Humanitas360 and Vortex Foundation 2018. 106p. Source: Internet Resource: The Global Observatory of Transnational Criminal Networks - Working Paper No. 29. VORTEX Working Paper No. 43; Accessed May 11, 2018 at: http://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/522e46_fcb25fe62d8f4776982f1fc39200e1f2.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Brazil URL: http://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/522e46_fcb25fe62d8f4776982f1fc39200e1f2.pdf Shelf Number: 150158 Keywords: BriberyCorruption and FraudCriminal NetworksFinancial CrimeMoney Laundering |
Author: Sgueo, Gianluca Title: The institutional architecture of EU anti-fraud measures: overview of a network Summary: In the European Union, several institutions, agencies and other bodies (collectively referred to as 'EU authorities') are concerned with preventing and combating fraud related to the EU budget. These EU authorities, and the activities they carry out - including policy-making, monitoring and operational tasks - make up a multi-layered network in which Member States and international organisations are also included. At the domestic level, national authorities contribute by detecting, prosecuting and reporting fraudulent behaviour in the use of European Union funds to the European Commission. At the same time, a number of international organisations coordinate efforts across countries and legal systems to combat fraud. The present analysis offers an overview of this network, with a focus on the European Union institutional framework. Details: Brussels: European Union, 2018. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 19, 2018 at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2018/623545/EPRS_IDA(2018)623545_EN.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Europe URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2018/623545/EPRS_IDA(2018)623545_EN.pdf Shelf Number: 150579 Keywords: Corruption Financial crimeFraud |
Author: Veen, H.C.J. van der Title: National Risk Assessment on Money Laundering for the Netherlands Summary: Dutch policy to prevent and combat money laundering is based on the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and EU directives and regulations. The FATF - an intergovernmental body set up by the G7 in 1989 - focuses on global prevention of money laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system. The majority of the FATF's recommendations has been adopted into the fourth EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive, applicable to all EU member states. In short, Article 7 of this directive obliges EU member states to implement a risk-based policy against money laundering and terrorist financing and to establish a National Risk Assessment (NRA). The goal of this NRA is to identify the ten most significant risks relating to money laundering in terms of their potential impact and to assess the 'resilience' of the policy instruments designed to prevent and combat money laundering. Resilience entails the functioning of policy instruments (including legislation), whereby the following is applicable: the greater the resilience, the more the risks are combatted. This initial NRA also describes a number of lessons learned that could be taken into account in the process of subsequent NRAs. Details: The Hague: WODC, 2017. 105p. Source: Internet Resource: Cahier 2017-13a: Accessed July 2, 2018 at: https://english.wodc.nl/binaries/Cahier%202017-13a_2689c_Full%20text_tcm29-328683.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Netherlands URL: https://english.wodc.nl/binaries/Cahier%202017-13a_2689c_Full%20text_tcm29-328683.pdf Shelf Number: 150759 Keywords: Economics and CrimeFinancial CrimeMoney LaunderingRisk AssessmentTerrorist FinancingUnderground Banking |
Author: Coyne, John Title: I can see clearly now! Technological innovation in Australian law enforcement: a case study of anti-money laundering Summary: The Australian government's technological monopolies have ended. Technological developments, especially those that have been disruptive, have been driven primarily by private corporations for at least the past ten years. Meanwhile, legislative responses to those changes, be they disruptive or otherwise, have been increasingly delayed. Acceleration in the development and use of technology has been matched by changes in the capability of those who would do us harm. In the face of rapid social change, governments have lost more than a technological edge, as the very conceptualisations of sovereignty and geographical jurisdictions are being challenged. Law enforcement agencies' traditional business models for dealing with organised crime are under significant pressure from threat actors that are able to operate more agile decision-making cycles and exploit seams between jurisdictions and in law enforcement agencies' capabilities. In this context, Australian law enforcement agencies face an increasing number of challenges from emergent technologies. A key policy challenge underpinning these issues relates to the limited capacity of law enforcement to introduce innovative strategies in response to disruptive technology. Another is how to make cross-jurisdictional cooperation simpler and easier. This report explores technological innovation in law enforcement through a specific crime type case study of anti-money laundering (AML) provisions. It analyses the factors that support or restrict technological innovation in federal law enforcement's AML efforts and argues that the current ecosystem for innovation for AML needs to be enhanced to engage with the dual challenge of disruptive technology, and the integration of existing pockets of AML excellence into a holistic whole-of-government innovation program. The initial steps for responding to this challenge should include an analysis of the central assumptions that underpin innovation, policy-making, strategy and finance in this space. Details: Barton, ACT: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2018. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 31, 2018 at: https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2018-07/SR%20123%20I%20can%20see%20clearly%20now.pdf?jLRQZUtiZ44.o66ipdnFVjoXF2plYehv Year: 2018 Country: Australia URL: https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2018-07/SR%20123%20I%20can%20see%20clearly%20now.pdf?jLRQZUtiZ44.o66ipdnFVjoXF2plYehv Shelf Number: 150983 Keywords: Anti-Money LaunderingFinancial CrimeMoney LaunderingOrganized CrimePolice Technology |
Author: Bangpan, Mukdarut Title: Fraud and error in financial, welfare and revenue services: A Systematic Map of the empirical research evidence with particular reference to 'notification of changes of circumstances' Summary: The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) recognises that, in order to meet its strategic objectives, it is crucial to pay the right amount of benefit to the right person at the right time. During 2008/09, the DWP spent approximately L135.6 billion on benefits, of which it is estimated that about two per cent (L2.7 billion) was overpaid due to fraud and error. Recent estimates suggest that there were about L550 million of over-payments of Income Support (IS) and Jobseeker's Allowance (JSA) (about five per cent of total spending on this type of benefit), L770 million on Housing Benefit (HB) (about 4.5 per cent of the total) and L340 million on Pension Credit (about 4.6 per cent of the total). Despite the increased measures undertaken to reduce fraud and error in the benefit system, the DWP acknowledges that new strategies for improving correctness of benefit payments are a priority. In the light of this official commitment to reducing overpayments, there is considerable interest in the process of notifying a 'change of circumstances (CoCs)' and in potential strategies to reduce fraud and error. This project aimed to identify and describe existing research literature on issues within related fields of financial products/services, welfare provision, taxation, and tax credit systems. This review is part of a wider programme of systematic review work commissioned by the DWP and carried out by the EPPI-Centre. Methodology The review described in this report is a 'systematic map' of the research evidence. The map does not aim to provide an answer to a specific policy question. Instead, the aim is to answer a question about the scope, nature and content of empirical research that has been carried out on a particular topic. This means that the question is broad, searching is extensive, and the results are presented in the form of a descriptive analysis of the research literature in the field. The mapping exercise followed a standardised systematic review process designed to minimise bias in the identification, selection and coding of primary studies. The results of this systematic map are derived from studies that explored people's attitudes towards financial products/services, welfare provision, and/or taxation/tax credit systems, and studies that investigated intervention programmes or initiatives aiming to reduce fraud and error. Details: Leeds: Corporate Document Services, 2011. 146p. Source: Internet Resource: Department for Work and Pensions Working Paper 97: Accessed August 3, 2018 at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/214394/WP97.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/214394/WP97.pdf Shelf Number: 151017 Keywords: Financial CrimeFraudTax FraudWelfare Fraud |
Author: Barone, Raffaella Title: Shedding light on money laundering. Is it a damping wave? Summary: This paper has three goals. First, some theoretical remarks about money laundering (the demand and supply sides) are made. Second, we provide a quantitative analysis of money laundering and a preliminary review of our empirical findings on the proceeds of transnational crime worldwide, as well as a breakdown of different types of crime proceeds. Third, we review literature on anti-money laundering and draw policy conclusions. The significance of our contribution is that we provide knowledge about money laundering which could be the basis of a more effective fight against transnational crime organizations. Details: Unpublished paper, 2018. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 8, 2018 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3204289 Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3204289 Shelf Number: 151051 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Financial CrimeMoney Laundering Organized Crime |
Author: Organization of American States Title: State of Cybersecurity in the Banking Sector in Latin America and the Caribbean Summary: This study is a contribution of the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States (OAS), which aims to provide verified information on the State of Cybersecurity in the Banking Sector in Latin America and the Caribbean. This document is yet another effort by the OAS in its task of strengthening the capacities and level of awareness in relation to the growing threats to digital security in our region. The information in this study was analyzed in two (2) fronts. The first concerns banking entities, examining data of 191 banking entities throughout the region. The other front focuses on the customers of the banking system, where the contributions of 722 users in the region were studied. To conduct this exploration, the OAS, with the support of experts from the banking sector, designed specific instruments for each target group. From the observations based on the instruments used, the main findings are presented. Details: Washington, DC: OAS, 2018. 181p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 3, 2018 at: http://www.oas.org/es/sms/cicte/sectorbancarioeng.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Latin America URL: http://www.oas.org/es/sms/cicte/sectorbancarioeng.pdf Shelf Number: 151779 Keywords: Banking Industry Cybercrime Cybersecurity Financial CrimeInternet Crime |
Author: Global Financial Integrity Title: A Scoping Study of Illicit Financial Flows Impacting Uganda Summary: Insufficient levels of financial transparency-globally and domestically-and government accountability in Uganda, coupled with a regulatory system that can incentivize financial crimes, are helping to drive high levels of illicit financial inflow and outflows in the country, which are undermining development efforts. Uganda will struggle to meet its goal of rising to middle income status and reducing its reliance on foreign debt unless it increases efforts to combat the commercial tax evasion, corruption, and money laundering of criminal proceeds and terrorist financing. Three policy areas should be the central focus for the government: eliminate the allowance and use of anonymous companies in the economy, reduce the ease and volumes of trade misinvoicing, and enforce anti-money laundering laws, particularly within the banking sector. Illicit financial flows (IFFs) in Uganda are part of a broader political economy dynamic where continued economic growth and development are hampered by corruption, impunity, and an opaque extractive sector. The growth in Uganda's economy and its role as a haven for legal and illegal activities stemming from neighboring countries like South Sudan, create perverse opportunities for illicit financial flows. The central government has a decent capacity to combat these opportunities for IFFs on paper, but its willingness or capacity to act to curtail IFFs is lagging. Trade misinvoicing is the most significant area of illicit financial flows in Uganda that can be estimated using publicly available data. From 2006-2015, the latest years for which the necessary data are available, potential trade misinvoicing amounted to roughly 18 percent of total Ugandan trade over the ten-year period. The figure for possible outflows is some 10 percent of total trade, and for possible inflows it is around 8 percent of total trade (2006-2015). Viewed in dollar terms, the potential over- and under-invoicing of imports from 2006-2015 was approximately US$4.9 billion, and over- and under-invoicing of exports may have reached US$1.7 billion. Uganda's laws and regulations on financial transparency and anti-money laundering have the strongest influence on illicit financial flows, and there are notable gaps in the framework the Government of Uganda has in place to address the sources, transfer methods, and motivations of IFFs in the country. In particular, laws governing corporations in Uganda are generally weak in so far as they do not require the official identification of the beneficial owners of companies or the complete identity of all shareholders in a company. The government's anti-money laundering regime mostly exists on paper and could do with strengthening. The Financial Intelligence Authority, which was only recently established, acknowledges this shortcoming and is working to enhance its performance in helping to prevent, track, and prosecute money laundering in the country. Uganda's extractive sector and the presence of numerous transnational crime markets add to the importance of both financial transparency and anti-money laundering. Details: Washington, DC: GFI, 2018. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed October 16, 2018 at: https://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/A-Scoping-Study-of-Illicit-Financial-Flows-Impacting-Uganda.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Uganda URL: https://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/A-Scoping-Study-of-Illicit-Financial-Flows-Impacting-Uganda.pdf Shelf Number: 152979 Keywords: Corporate CorruptionCorporate CrimeFinancial CrimeIllicit Financial FlowsMoney LaunderingTax EvasionTerrorist financing |
Author: National Employment Law Project Title: Winning Wage Justice: An Advocate's Guide to State and City Policies to Fight Wage Theft Summary: By any measure, wage theft in America is threatening to become a defining trend of the 21st century labor market. In the past year alone, workers recovered tens of millions of dollars in unpaid wages from their employers in a range of industries. For example, Staples paid $42 million in illegally underpaid wages to its assistant store managers, New Jersey truck delivery drivers received $2 million in an unpaid overtime settlement, Walmart settled an unpaid wages case for $35 million in Washington State, and New York car wash workers received $3.5 million in unpaid overtime. Behind these high-profile cases sits a growing body of research that documents a broad and worsening wage theft crisis in America. In a landmark 2009 study, Broken Laws, Unprotected Workers, researchers surveyed more than 4,000 workers in low-wage industries in Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York, and found that 26 percent had been paid less than the minimum wage in the preceding week, and 76 percent had either been underpaid or not paid at all for their overtime hours. Dozens of studies by organizers and advocates in specific industries have uncovered similar rates of wage-related violations (as well as related health and safety, workers compensation, and right-to-organize violations). And in audits of employers in 1999 and 2000, the US Department of Labor (USDOL) found high rates of minimum wage, overtime and other violations across the country, including in 50 percent of Pittsburgh restaurants, 74 percent of Georgia day care centers, 50 percent of St. Louis nursing homes, 38 percent of Reno hotels and motels, and 47 percent of adult family homes in Seattle, to name just a few. Wage theft is not incidental, aberrant or rare, committed by a few rogue employers at the periphery of the labor market. It takes place in industries that span the economy- including retail, restaurants and grocery stores; caregiver industries such as home health care and domestic work; blue collar industries such as manufacturing, construction and wholesalers; building services such as janitorial and security; and personal services such as dry cleaning and laundry, car washes, and beauty and nail salons. Immigrants, women and people of color are particularly hard hit, although all workers are at risk of the many forms of wage theft: being paid less than the minimum wage, working off the clock without pay, getting less than time and a half for overtime hours, having tips stolen, and seeing illegal deductions taken out of paychecks. Minimum wage and overtime laws are the anchors of the employment relationship in the United States. They are the central vehicle by which public policy guarantees fundamental protections for workers. If we cede these most basic laws to rampant evasion and violation, we are effectively setting the clock back to the early 1900s, before the enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), when the lack of any wage floor resulted in terrible working conditions. The wage theft crisis has many roots. Repercussions for violating the law are often not strong enough to dissuade employers, and declining resources and ineffective strategies by government enforcement agencies mean that employers have little fear of getting caught. Inadequate protections for workers who want to make claims of wage theft result in high rates of retaliation. And new forms of work and production, including outsourcing to subcontractors and misclassifying workers as independent contractors, have created confusion and allowed employers to move growing numbers of workers outside the reach of the law. The case for fighting wage theft is first and foremost about fairness and justice-but it is also about economics. There is the significant cost to workers and their families, which in one week alone is estimated to be $56.4 million in New York, Chicago and Los Angeles combined. There is the cost to taxpayers in lost revenues when employers fail to pay payroll taxes. There is the cost to our local economies, with fewer dollars circulating to local businesses, stunting economic recovery. And there is the cost to growth and opportunity as generations of workers are trapped in sub-minimum wage jobs. Every day, millions of responsible, profitable employers in this country comply with minimum wage and overtime laws. When we allow their unscrupulous competitors to undercut them on labor costs, we are starting a race to the bottom that will reverberate throughout the entire labor market in a cascading loss of good jobs. Everyone has a stake in this issue. Fighting wage theft is not about adding new burdens onto law-abiding employers. It is about smarter enforcement of laws that are already on the books, closing gaping loopholes and enacting stronger enforcement tools. In this guide, our goal is to support and build upon the surging grassroots energy around wage theft campaigns in cities and states across the country. Advocates are using high-profile street protests and new organizing strategies to target unscrupulous employers. They are mounting multi-year campaigns to update legal protections and set up new enforcement mechanisms. And they are pushing the issue of wage theft onto the airwaves, educating the public and lawmakers alike about the scale of the problem and how to fight it. In the process, they are creating strong, enduring coalitions of worker centers, unions, legal services groups, policy think tanks, and other low-wage worker advocates. By providing our allies a concrete menu of innovative policies to strengthen enforcement of minimum wage and overtime laws-as well as strategic guidance on identifying which policies make sense in a given community-our hope is that we help turn the tide and shift the American workplace from wage theft to wage justice. Details: New York: The Project, 2011. 136p. Source: Initernet Resource: Accessed October 24, 2018 at: https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/WinningWageJustice2011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/WinningWageJustice2011.pdf Shelf Number: 153081 Keywords: Economic CrimesFinancial Crime Labor Law Violations Wage Theft Worker Exploitation |
Author: Hallett, Nicole Title: Workers on the Brink: Low-Wage Employment in Buffalo and Erie County Summary: In 2017, Professor Hallett, winner of a public research fellowship from Open Buffalo and PPG, conducted a survey of 213 workers in Buffalo to learn more about the challenges they are facing. The survey found that local low-wage workers experience high rates of legal violations. In all, 58.9% of low-wage workers reported at least one wage and hour violation, and 56% reported at least one potential health and safety violation. In particular, among low-wage workers participating in the survey: - 16% reported making below the applicable federal or state minimum wage; - 35% reported not being paid overtime in violation of federal or state law; - 16% reported working off the clock without being paid; - 27% reported that they had failed to receive their pay on time; - 24% of low-wage workers making tips reported that their employer had taken some of their tips in violation of federal or state law; - 33.3% of low-wage workers who reported handling dangerous materials or operating dangerous equipment as part of their jobs reported that their employer did not provide adequate safety or protective gear; and 26.7% reported not being properly trained to avoid accident or injury; - 21.6% of low-wage workers who complained about their pay or working conditions to their employer reported being retaliated against. The survey revealed clear differences based on gender, race/ethnicity, and citizenship status. Women, members of racial and ethnic minorities, and non-citizens reported higher violation rates in response to most questions. The report's recommendations include: -- The City of Buffalo and Erie County should: - pass wage theft ordinances that penalizes employers who do not pay their workers. - pass laws that require employers to provide paid sick leave. - refrain from doing business with companies that have bad health and safety records. - The Buffalo Police Department and the Erie County District Attorney's Office should treat wage theft as a crime. - Buffalo should raise its living wage rate to $15 per hour. - Erie County should pass a living wage law, requiring companies that do business with the County to pay a living wage of $15 per hour. Details: Buffalo, NY: Partnership for the Public Good; Open Buffalo, 2018. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Report: Accessed November 20, 2018 at: https://ppgbuffalo.org/files/documents/poverty_low_wage_work_income_inequality/workers_on_the_brink__low_wage_employment_in_buffalo_and_erie_county_4112018.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://ppgbuffalo.org/files/documents/poverty_low_wage_work_income_inequality/workers_on_the_brink__low_wage_employment_in_buffalo_and_erie_county_4112018.pdf Shelf Number: 153518 Keywords: Economic Crimes Financial Crime Labor Law Violations Wage Theft |
Author: Hernandez, Cynthia S. Title: Wage Theft: An Economic Drain on Florida. How Millions of Dollars are Stolen from Florida's Workforce Summary: This is the second in a series of reports monitoring the growing problem of wage theft in Florida. Using previously unanalyzed data from the U.S. Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division and separate data from various community organizations, this report shows evidence of a widespread problem across a broad spectrum of industries in Florida. The industries especially impacted are those commonly thought of as the core of Florida's economy-tourism, retail trade, and construction. Moreover, it appears more likely to affect those workers who can least afford it. Workers who receive low wages seem to be more likely to have their wages stolen by employers and as demonstrated in this report this is a large number of people. But, even this data does not account for the full magnitude of the problem, as an unknown number of cases go unreported. Indeed, as data on wage theft accumulates, the more it becomes clear how widespread wage theft is in the state of Florida and throughout the state's industries. Wage theft is defined as workers not receiving wages that they are legally owed. It occurs in different forms including unpaid overtime, not being paid at least the minimum wage, working during meal breaks, misclassification of employees as independent contractors, forcing employees to work off the clock, altering time cards or pay stubs, illegally deducting money from employees' pay checks, paying employees late, or simply not paying employees at all. Unfortunately, many employers know they can get away with wage theft and have little fear of sanction. Enforcement mechanisms are weak, due to lack of dedicated enforcement capacity at the state level, limited capacity of local branches of the Federal Department of Labor, and the gaps in U.S. labor laws that leave many employees unprotected. The data from this report reveal that: - Over $28 million of unpaid wages have been recovered by the U.S. Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division in Florida, Miami-Dade's Wage Theft Ordinance and community groups throughout Florida. - The primary pillars of Florida's economy are undermined by widespread theft of employees' wages. Florida's key industries have the highest numbers of reported wage violations- tourism, retail trade and construction. - An average of 3,036 wage violations per year are reported to the U.S. Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division in Florida (DOL-WHD). - In spite of ample evidence of widespread wage theft among low income workers, as of December 2011, the Florida Attorney General had not brought one single civil action to enforce the state's minimum wage law enacted in 2004. - Since the full implementation of the Miami-Dade County Wage Theft Ordinance in September 2010, the Miami-Dade County's Small Business Development agency has recovered nearly $400,000 in unpaid wages for 313 workers who unlawfully had their wages withheld from them. - Out of the six counties we analyzed, the largest number of cases were in Miami-Dade County followed by Hillsborough, Broward, Pinellas, Palm Beach and Orange counties in that order. Overall, the data suggest that the primary pillars of Florida's economy are undermined by widespread theft of employees' wages. Florida's key industries have the highest numbers of reported wage violations-tourism, retail trade and construction. Tourism, represented by Accommodation and Food Services in official data, has been a core focus of Florida's economy for nearly a century and it has the highest frequency of reported wage violations. Retail trade has been a growing generator of employment in Florida for decades. Jobs in both tourism and retail tend to pay relatively low wages. Thus, when there is theft from wages that are already relatively low, employees and their families are likely to suffer even more severely. The third industry plagued by wage theft, construction, does offer higher average wages than either tourism or retail trade, but the averages conceal considerable variation. While wages in the construction industry are higher on average than tourism or retail trade, much construction work is done through subcontracting with often only verbal agreements between a subcontractor and employees; and wages are often paid in cash. Under these conditions, it is relatively easy and common for subcontractors to not pay employees the wages they are due. The wage theft stories collected by community based organizations offer a glimpse into the impact of wage theft on individual employees. They demonstrate the unscrupulous competitive advantage that some employers gain by ignoring the law and causing suffering most often among those who can least afford it. When we consider that many employees who lose wages to wage theft earn at or near minimum wage with no benefits like health insurance we can imagine that the loss of even a small amount of earnings imposes real hardship. In the six most populous Florida counties, the Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division recovered wages just under $16 million dollars. The average amount of recovered wages is $651 per employee who made a claim, more than a full week's work for someone earning $15 an hour, and more than two weeks work for someone earning the minimum wage. This average is a significant amount of money for an individual employee to lose over the course of a year. But, any loss of legitimately earned wages is a significant financial loss and a violation not only of the law but also of the social contract between employee and employer that is fundamental to a market economy. This analysis of wage theft cases also raises the question of whether a county and state economy can be healthy and grow while tolerating an unjust business model that avoids contributing to tax revenues. The employers who fail to follow the laws concerning their employees create an unfair business environment that penalizes those who do follow the law. Maintaining a level playing field for businesses is critical to maintaining a competitive business environment and to economic growth. The dishonest business model of practicing wage theft puts law abiding employers at a competitive disadvantage and undermines Florida's efforts to attract business. This report reveals that through the efforts of the U.S. Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division, Miami-Dade County's Wage Theft Ordinance, and community organizations throughout Florida, millions of dollars of unpaid wages have been recovered. Yet, all indicators are that much more can be done by simply enforcing existing wage and hour laws and by creating a statewide process that address the problem, since Florida has no state equivalent to a Department of Labor to investigate wage and hour complaints and does not have staff to enforce its minimum wage law. The evidence accumulating of a spreading illegal and ultimately an anti-business practice raises serious questions for a state economy and local economies hoping to attract businesses and employees to grow. Details: Miami, FL: Research Institute on Social and Economic Policy, Center for Labor Research and Studies, Florida International University, 2012. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 20, 2018 at: https://www.reimaginerpe.org/files/Wage-Theft_How-Millions-of-Dollars-are-Stolen-from-Floridas-Workforce_final.docx1_.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: https://www.reimaginerpe.org/files/Wage-Theft_How-Millions-of-Dollars-are-Stolen-from-Floridas-Workforce_final.docx1_.pdf Shelf Number: 153519 Keywords: Economic Crimes Financial Crime Labor Law Violations Wage Theft Worker Exploitation |
Author: C4ADS Title: Sandcastles: Tracing Sanctions Evasion Through Dubai's Luxury Real Estate Market Summary: Executive Summary Illicit actors, whether narcotics traffickers, nuclear proliferators, conflict financiers, kleptocrats, large-scale money launderers, or terrorists, all share a common need: they must move the proceeds of their criminal endeavors from the illicit marketplace into the licit financial system in order to use them effectively. Luxury real estate has become a significant pathway for this conversion, facilitated by imperfect information regarding ownership and the details behind these substantial financial transactions. This vulnerability affects major real estate markets around the world, including, but not limited to, London, Toronto, Hong Kong, New York, Singapore, Doha, Sydney, and Paris. Dubai, the largest city in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), has become a favorable destination for these funds due in part to its high-end luxury real estate market and lax regulatory environment prizing secrecy and anonymity. While the UAE has taken steps to address this issue, its response thus far has failed to fully confront the underlying drivers enabling the manipulation of its real estate market. The permissive nature of this environment has global security implications far beyond the UAE. In an interconnected global economy with low barriers impeding the movement of funds, a single point of weakness in the regulatory system can empower a range of illicit actors. Our research shows that lax regulatory and enforcement environments – in Dubai, but also in other financial centers – have attracted criminal capital from around the world and offered a pathway into the international financial system for illicit actors and funds. In this report, we examine seven individuals and organizations, their associated corporate networks, and their real estate holdings. We identify 44 properties worth approximately $28.2 million directly associated with sanctioned individuals, as well as 37 properties worth approximately $78.8 million within their expanded networks. Each of these people has been sanctioned by the United States (US), and many have also been designated by the European Union (EU) and EU member states. These networks are, therefore, deserving of particularly intense regulatory scrutiny. However, our research reveals that they have invested millions of dollars in luxury UAE real estate while continuing to engage in illicit activity within the last few years. Details: Washington, DC: 2018. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 18, 2019 at: https://www.c4reports.org/sandcastles/ Year: 2018 Country: United Arab Emirates URL: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58831f2459cc684854aa3718/t/5b1fd4bf575d1ff600587770/1528812745821/Sandcastles.pdf Shelf Number: 154241 Keywords: Conflict FinanciersDubaiFinancial CrimeIllicit ActorsIllicit NetworksLuxury Real EstateMoney LaunderingReal EstateTerroristsUAE |
Author: Global Financial Integrity Title: Illicit Financial Flows to and from 148 Developing Countries: 2006-2015 Summary: This is the latest in a series of reports, issued on a roughly annual basis by Global Financial Integrity (GFI), which provides country-level estimates of the illicit flows of money into and out of 148 developing and emerging market nations as a result of their trade in goods with advanced economies, as classified by the International Monetary Fund. Such flows - hereafter referred to as illicit financial flows (IFFs)-are estimated over the years from 2006 to 2015, the most recent ten year period for which comprehensive data are available. In addition to updating the estimated IFFs GFI has presented in the past, this report widens the scope of its research and uses a more detailed database published by the United Nations (UN) along with updated measures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) data it has used previously. This report presents estimates of IFFs based on both data sets. GFI defines IFFs as "money that is illegally earned, used or moved and which crosses an international border." Currently, the World Bank, IMF, UN, and the OECD use a similar definition. This study underscores the point that trade-related IFFs appear to be both significant and persistent features of developing country trade with advanced economies. As such, trade misinvoicing remains an obstacle to achieving sustainable and equitable growth in the developing world. Details: Washington, DC: GFI, 2019. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 18, 2019 at: https://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/GFI-2019-IFF-Update-Report-1.29.18.pdf Year: 2019 Country: International URL: https://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/GFI-2019-IFF-Update-Report-1.29.18.pdf Shelf Number: 154642 Keywords: Corporate CorruptionCorporate CrimeFinancial CrimeIllicit Financial FlowsMoney LaunderingTax EvasionTerrorist financingTrade Misinvoicing |
Author: Cavanough, Edward Title: Ending Wage Theft: Eradicating Underpayment in the Australian Workplace Summary: Wage theft is now one of the most pressing public policy issues in Australia. In some sectors of the economy it has transitioned from a fringe activity to a business model. And at the same time, most Australians haven't seen a decent pay-rise in more than half a decade. Wage theft and low wage growth are related. Our Falling Wages, Stalling Growth report highlighted how wage theft by some businesses undermines the ability of their competitors to give their staff a pay rise: a reminder that it's in everyone's economic interests to put an end to this pernicious practice. This report builds on that 2018 report with a closer look at the people in our workforce that are most at risk to having their wages stolen. From young workers in hospitality not getting super or penalty rates to migrant workers in horticulture and more, we see that some segments of the population are more vulnerable than others. At the same time few, if any, sectors of the economy can say they are free from blemish - it's more a question of degrees or differing forms that wage theft takes than whether or not it occurs. The report also seeks to highlight the financial and welfare impacts on those workers and their families as well as the flow-on consequences for the broader economy, including the Federal Budget deficit. Recognising that this harmful habit by some has become a community-wide problem that warrants all of our attention, this report puts forward ideas and solutions to eradicate wage theft. These are grouped into four broad categories. First, this report advocates for a set of measures designed to demonstrate a zero-tolerance approach to wage theft. This includes reinforcing steps already underway to criminalise wage theft at a state level as well as new proposals to have it recognised as a form of anti-competitive conduct that will enable legitimate employers to seek damages when a competitor has undermined their business by underpaying their staff. Second, measures to make compliance more straight forward for employers in the first place and private enforcement action more accessible for employees are then explored. In corporate parlance, the latter means ensuring an effective right of audit for employees or unions acting on their behalf. Meanwhile streamlining the payment of superannuation and payroll is a simple example of how unnecessary complexity can be removed for employers. Third, we argue boosting public resources to tackle wage theft as well as improving government enforcement activities are required. Every dollar underpaid to staff means less income and payroll taxes flowing into government coffers. Conversely, this means whenever an employee makes a successful claim for underpaid wages the budget bottom line is improved. In effect, the commonweal and state treasurers are free-riding on some of the more vulnerable workers in our labour force when it really should be the other way around. This is why we have proposed legislating the Stopping Wage Theft Subsidy Pool to subsidise private enforcement action, education campaigns and to reward whistleblowers. Finally, the report looks at how other, often unrelated, areas of government policy need to be improved to ensure they don't unintentionally reward or encourage wage theft. The report puts forward specific suggestions in relation to government procurement and grants as well as immigration, and recommends the establishment of a whole-of-government taskforce to ensure all commonwealth policy levers are aligned towards ending wage theft as a business model. Details: Melbourne: McKell Institute Victoria, 2019. 67p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 27, 2019 at: https://mckellinstitute.org.au/app/uploads/McKell-Ending-Wage-Theft.pdf Year: 2019 Country: Australia URL: https://mckellinstitute.org.au/app/uploads/McKell-Ending-Wage-Theft.pdf Shelf Number: 155189 Keywords: Economic Crimes Financial Crime Labor Law Violations Wage Theft Worker Exploitation |
Author: Walker, Summer Title: Fragmented But Far-Reaching: The UN System's mandate and response to organized crime Summary: From peace operations to how to better manage forests and food supply chains, the United Nations (UN) is engaged in the fight against organized crime and efforts to mitigate its impact within the ambit of the UN's wider goals: peace and security, human rights and sustainable development. Mandates relating to key crime types are often allocated to one or more agencies or departments across the UN System, but, as always, mandates evolve, and information about these mandates and the relevant programmes and activities carried out by agencies can be fragmented, scattered and duplicatory. For some emerging or resurging forms of crime, mandates allocated decades ago have required a far more comprehensive set of responses in their contemporary forms. To better understand the UN's overall mandate for addressing organized crime, the Global Initiative conducted a desk review of the UN's entities and agencies to identify their mandates and working agendas for organized crime, specifically in relation to the UN's work on six crime types that have had major impacts on broader UN goals, including the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This paper is a companion piece to an interactive online tool, which displays the organized-crime agendas within the UN System. The tool's purpose is to provide a better understanding of the UN's counter-crime work and serve as a basis for discussion about how organized crime challenges, which are now far-reaching and serious, could be more effectively met and how UN System resources can be used more coherently. The mandate for addressing organized crime extends across the UN System in a way that is expansive, exhaustive and certainly under-appreciated. A review by the Global Initiative has identified a working agenda for 79 out of the UN's 102 entities, bodies and agencies, or nearly 77 per cent. The research (see Figure 1) found that 37 per cent of these entities address human trafficking, and 33 per cent work on illicit drugs. Environmental crime was third, with 28 per cent of entities addressing related issues. Cybercrime and financial crime both saw 22 out of the 102 entities addressing the issue (21 per cent), and arms trafficking is worked on by 21 entities, yet this understanding of arms trafficking does not include illicit chemical and nuclear material trafficking. This paper examines the implications this has for the UN System given such a widely dispersed mandate. Organized crime is a cross-cutting threat to the goals of many different sectors, in all three core areas of the UN's work: peace and security, human rights and development. Previous analysis conducted by the Global Initiative found that organized crime affects a high proportion of the SDGs. An additional Global Initiative review of UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions in 2018 found that 22 of the 54 resolutions (40 per cent) referred to a form of organized crime, showing a significant recognition of the problem on the international security agenda. Given the diverse nature of organized-crime threats, it is possible to argue that perhaps it is only right that the requirement to respond to organized crime is distributed across the UN System so widely. But without a coherent strategy underpinning this wide mandate, responses to organized crime across the system can be fragmented, and opportunities to achieve synergies and learn lessons from responses are not maximized, or perhaps not realized at all. Organized crime is a challenge that rises and falls on the global policy priority list. The diversity of illicit markets and the fact the harm caused by organized crime tends to be more corrosive in nature than sensational mean that it is often overlooked or downgraded on the priority list. However, over the past two decades, there have been certain points when the threat of a specific form of organized crime became so compelling that it demanded an urgent response from the international community and the UN System. These flashpoints in the debate - for example, during the piracy crisis in the Gulf of Aden in 2011/12 (see page 3), or the demand for a response to human smuggling and trafficking in 2016/17 - have regrettably shone a light on the UN System's shortcomings rather than draw attention to the efficacy of the world's global governance mechanism to respond to shared, transnational threats that require collective response. Many efforts have been made to create better UN System coherence, but with the global scale and impact of organized crime on the rise, the need to recognize its corrosive impact on major UN objectives should be an imperative for the following reasons: - Organized crime is a leading cause of violence and homicide globally. - Criminal interests and corruption in natural-resource sectors are leading drivers of deforestation and unsustainable natural-resource extraction. - Organized crime has a destructive impact on governance, anti-corruption, economic development and trade, and environmental protection efforts. - Serious rights violations to individuals are caused by organized crime, such as the interlinking phenomena of modern slavery, forced labour, human trafficking and aggravated smuggling. It is very clear when looking at the spread of activity across the system that the issue is not solely a law-enforcement problem. Threats posed by criminal groups are wide-ranging: they impact good governance, breed corruption and weaken development agendas. A holistic view of the issues aligned with increased coherence would help shrink the learning curve on the pervasive impact of organized crime on international security, development and human rights. Details: Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2019. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 24, 2019 at: https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/gitoc_un_june_19.pdf Year: 2019 Country: International URL: https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/gitoc_un_june_19.pdf Shelf Number: 156607 Keywords: Arms TraffickingCybercrimeEnvironmental CrimeFinancial CrimeHuman RightsHuman TraffickingIllicit DrugsModern SlaveryOrganized CrimeTransnational Organized CrimeUnited Nations |
Author: Petrie, Elizabeth M. Title: Sharing Insider Threat Indicators: Examining the Potential Use of Swift's Messaging Platform to Combat Cyber Fraud Summary: Cyber actors are operating under a shared services model giving them access to infrastructure, tools, targets and the ability to monetise their exploits. As a result, organisations across industries must enhance communication channels to share threat information in order to pre-empt cyber fraud schemes. This requires both an ability to identify the patterns of behaviour that indicate cyber fraud activity is occurring and a platform for communicating potential threat information. The report "Sharing Insider Threat Indicators: Leveraging SWIFT's Messaging Platform to Combat Cyber Fraud" focuses on identifying the patterns of behaviour typically indicative of efforts by criminals to use insiders to cash out on fraudulent activity. The objective of this research is to explore the potential for organisations to use an existing telecommunication platform, such as SWIFT, to communicate cyber fraud threat information by establishing indicators of cashout behaviour, which could warn of cyber fraud activity. Details: London: Swift Institute, 2017. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 27, 2019 at: https://swiftinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/SIWP_2016-003_Insider_Cashout_Citi_American_University_final.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://swiftinstitute.org/research/sharing-threat-indicators-of-cyber-fraud-via-intelligence-information-reports/ Shelf Number: 156723 Keywords: Cyber FraudCyber SecurityCybercrimeFinancial CrimeTelecommunications |
Author: Duffie, Darrell Title: Cyber Runs Summary: Our analysis of a sample of twelve systemically important U.S. financial institutions suggests that these firms have sufficient stocks of high quality liquid assets to cover wholesale funding runoffs in a relatively extreme cyber run. Beyond their own stocks of liquid assets, these institutions have access to substantial additional emergency liquidity from Federal Reserve banks. The resiliency of the largest banks to cyber runs does not, however, ensure that the payment system would continue to process payments sufficiently rapidly to avoid damage to the real economy. During a severe cyber event, especially one whose reach into the banking system is uncertain, nonbanks may be reluctant to send funds through customary bank payment nodes. As a potential safeguard, we raise the idea of an "emergency payment node," a narrow payment-bank utility that could be activated during operational emergencies to process payments between a key set of non-bank financial firms. We end with an overview of other forms of preparedness, including cyber-run stress tests. Details: Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 2019. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 25, 2019 at: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/WP51-Duffie-Younger-2.pdf Year: 2019 Country: United States URL: https://www.brookings.edu/research/cyber-runs/ Shelf Number: 157054 Keywords: Cyber Attack Cyber Crime Cyber Run Financial Crime |